For about a year and a half, since the outbreak of the “Iron Swords” war against Hamas in the Gaza Strip—following the deadly terrorist attack on the border communities on October 7, 2023—the Palestinian Authority (PA) under Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) has been experiencing a decline in status. This is evident in the continued downward trend in public support for the PA, its growing economic difficulties, and the problems and deficiencies in functioning security apparatuses.
Abu Mazen is widely perceived—both within the Palestinian political sphere and from the perspective of the broader Arab system—as a leader whose time has passed. However, the Palestinian political arena has entered the post-Abbas era in recent years. This is reflected in the ongoing maneuvering of senior Fatah officials vying for leadership positions, seeking to improve their standing and gain an advantage in the expected succession battle.
The prevailing impression is that Abu Mazen, who turned 89 in November 2024, is in the final stretch of his historical tenure. Polls conducted periodically among the Palestinian public indicate consistently high dissatisfaction with his leadership, with significant support for his resignation. For example, in a survey conducted in September 2024, 84% of Palestinians expressed support for his departure.
Like his predecessor, Yasser Arafat, Abu Mazen has refrained from appointing a clear successor who would step into his shoes when he can no longer lead. He holds three key leadership roles: President of the Palestinian Authority, Chairman of the PLO Executive Committee, and leader of Fatah, the dominant faction within the PLO. Given these circumstances, it remains unclear who will succeed him and how the transition will unfold.
Power struggles among senior Fatah figures vying for leadership are a real possibility, and these rivalries could escalate into violent clashes, potentially even bloodshed. However, those competing for leadership will also likely engage in behind-the-scenes negotiations to reach understandings on the distribution of key positions to contain the power struggle and make it less overtly confrontational.
At this stage, several senior Fatah figures are considered potential contenders for leadership, with emphasis on Hussein Al-Sheikh, Minister of Civil Affairs and Secretary-General of Fatah; Mohammad Mustafa, the Palestinian Authority’s Prime Minister; and Majed Faraj, head of the General Intelligence Service. Recently, Abu Mazen announced that Rawhi Fattouh, a member of Fatah’s Central Committee, would serve as interim President of the Palestinian Authority for 90 days after his death, until elections could be held. Fattouh previously served as Speaker of the Palestinian Legislative Council, Chairman of the Palestinian National Council, and interim President of the PA. Before that, he was Minister of Agriculture in Ahmed Qurei’s (“Abu Ala”) government and a member of the Palestinian Legislative Council.
It is worth noting that the last Palestinian Authority presidential elections took place 20 years ago, in January 2005, a few months after Arafat’s death in November 2004 in Paris, where Abu Mazen emerged victorious.
The Egyptian Initiative: Governance by a Temporary Independent Body
The Palestinian Authority’s weakened status under Abu Mazen, and its near-total irrelevance regarding the governance model for Gaza the day after, were demonstrated at the Arab leaders’ summit (Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, and the PLO) held in Riyadh on February 21 this year. The summit was marked by sharp disagreements among participants, to the extent that no joint concluding statement was issued.
In practice, the meeting prepared for the upcoming Arab summit, scheduled for March 4, 2025. According to reports in the Arab media, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi and PA President Mahmoud Abbas have significantly diverged regarding the preferred alternative to U.S. President Donald Trump’s post-war plan for Gaza.
Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE opposed granting the Palestinian Authority control over the financial resources designated for Gaza’s reconstruction. President Sisi expressed interest in handing over the administration of Gaza to a temporary independent body under the supervision of Egypt, the European Union, and the Palestinian Authority. In contrast, Abu Mazen sought to rally Arab states, particularly Saudi Arabia, behind his initiative. He aimed to reduce opposition from Egypt and the UAE to the PA, central to governing Gaza.
It is important to note that the evolving Arab plan for post-war governance in Gaza envisions establishing a technocratic government for the region, with substantial funding allocated for reconstruction. The ultimate goal of this Arab initiative is to present a viable alternative to President Trump’s proposal, which involves relocating Palestinians from Gaza to Egypt and Jordan, thereby allowing the U.S. to take control of Gaza and oversee its rehabilitation. The Arab plan explicitly rejects forced displacement of Palestinians as well as U.S. control over Gaza.
The leaders who participated in the Riyadh summit hope to finalize the broad outlines of their plan in time for the emergency Arab summit, which will include representatives from all 22 Arab League member states.
Thinking Outside the Box
Israel has officially aligned itself with President Trump’s plan, with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu even declaring that it is “committed” to the plan, which he described as a “bold vision” for the Gaza Strip. Meanwhile, Arab states hope to rally support for their plan by offering generous financial aid. According to a United Nations estimate, rebuilding Gaza after 15 months of warfare could amount to approximately $50 billion. The exact sum to be offered by the Arab states is still under review, but it is expected to be significant. Egyptian Prime Minister Mostafa Madbouly recently stated that civilian construction companies, including those from Egypt, can build 30,000 housing units within about three years.
The first phase of the Arab plan focuses on rehabilitating areas of Gaza that have not been destroyed, with Arab states willing to provide financial assistance only if additional political and security measures are implemented.
The planned technocratic committee responsible for managing Gaza under the Arab plan will not include Hamas, which has controlled the Strip for nearly two decades since June 2007. Hamas will have no governing role in Gaza, which will be administered as a single political entity alongside the West Bank. Arab states are interested in ensuring that the Palestinian Authority, which governs the West Bank, has some degree of influence and participation in the administrative body that will oversee Gaza’s affairs. It has been suggested that the technocratic government set to operate in Gaza is intended as a temporary administrative body to oversee reconstruction and will remain in place until elections can be held.
President Trump’s plan for the “day after” took Arab states by surprise. However, despite their rejection of its terms and unusual, unexpected, “outside-the-box” nature, it has positively impacted them. In practice, it has “shuffled the deck” and spurred them into action, pushing them to devise alternative proposals that would undermine the American president’s plan and render it unrealistic and unfeasible.
Another major obstacle to implementing any plan is Hamas’s determination to remain a robust and influential force in Gaza. This is reflected in the organization’s refusal to disarm or agree to exile its senior members.
Calls for Structural and Functional Reforms
The weakness of the Palestinian Authority stems primarily from a significant gap between public expectations on the one hand and its leadership’s inability to fulfill them on the other. The Palestinian public aspires to end Israeli occupation and establish an independent Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital. As time passes—especially in the aftermath of the “Iron Swords” war—it is becoming increasingly clear that this goal is drifting further out of reach and is unlikely to be realized shortly.
Moreover, growing public protests and criticism against the Palestinian Authority are evident, particularly on social media. The PA is portrayed as weak, ineffective, and incapable of advancing Palestinian national objectives. Additionally, it is perceived as prioritizing Israeli and American interests over those of the Palestinian people.
The growing tension between the Ramallah leadership and the Palestinian public is reflected in three main trends. The first is the increasing power and influence of extremist factions, particularly the Islamist organizations—Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades of Fatah. These groups harshly criticize the PA, viewing it as failing to advance Palestinian national rights and as collaborating with Israel’s agenda. From their perspective, armed struggle remains the only viable path to achieving Palestinian national goals.
The second trend concerns Israel’s stance, which Palestinians see as obstructing political progress and further weakening the PA’s authority. The third trend reflects a growing belief—especially among middle-generation Palestinians—that violent confrontation with Israel is unproductive, does not serve core Palestinian interests, and results in large-scale Israeli military retaliation. As a result, many are increasingly advocating for a political process to resolve the Palestinian issue. This includes opposing radical Islamist movements that continue to promote armed struggle as the primary means of achieving national aspirations.
Additionally, criticism is mounting against the Palestinian Authority under Abbas’s leadership, which, despite being in power for two decades, has failed to achieve tangible progress in realizing Palestinian national goals.
Against this backdrop, there is a rising demand within this faction for structural and functional reforms in the Palestinian governmental and security establishment to increase democratization within the PA. Such reforms would be carried out in coordination with and with the support of pragmatic, moderate Arab states. Ultimately, after the Abbas era, the goal would be establishing a new Palestinian leadership to advance national objectives through renewed diplomatic negotiations with Israel, economic development, and security stabilization.
Meanwhile, uncertainty persists regarding the possible implementation of agreements mediated between Israel and Hamas concerning a ceasefire and the phased or immediate release of Israeli hostages held in Gaza. The situation in Gaza and the feasibility of post-war governance plans will largely depend on whether these agreements materialize. If not, Israel is expected to resume military operations until Hamas’s military and governmental control is decisively dismantled. Such a resolution is seen as essential.
On the “day after,” Israel will have no choice but to establish complete military and administrative control over Gaza for at least a defined period. This will be necessary to prevent Hamas from reasserting control over the Strip and, consequently, posing a renewed threat to Israel’s security.
