On April 9, 2026, the Government of Israel announced the opening of direct negotiations with the Government of Lebanon, with the declared objective of establishing peaceful relations between the two states and disarming Hezbollah.
However, negotiations between Israel and the Lebanese government are doomed to fail from the outset. At present, they have no realistic chance of ending successfully. This is because even if the Lebanese government were eager to achieve such an outcome, and as will be explained below it is not truly interested in doing so, it is incapable of carrying it out. The Lebanese state is not sovereign within its own territory, it does not control the armed forces operating from within it, and it cannot make strategic decisions without the approval of Hezbollah, the very organization it is being asked to dismantle.
Five times over the past forty years, the international community demanded that Lebanon dismantle the armed organization operating from its territory. Five times it agreed, and five times it failed to comply. The recurring pattern in all these cases indicates that this is not a malfunction but rather an inherent characteristic of the system.
Thus, on May 17, 1983, Israel and Lebanon signed an official peace agreement that included the dismantling of militias and the deployment of the Lebanese Army in southern Lebanon. However, the Lebanese Parliament refused to ratify it under Syrian and broader Arab pressure, and in 1987 it was officially annulled. In 1989, the Taif Agreement stipulated that all Lebanese militias would disarm. Hezbollah argued that the agreement did not apply to it, claiming that it was not a militia but rather a “resistance movement.” The Lebanese government accepted this distinction and allowed it to remain armed.
In September 2004, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1559, which explicitly demanded the disarmament of all militias in Lebanon and the deployment of the Lebanese Army from the Litani River to the Israeli border. Lebanon voted against the resolution under Syrian pressure. Two years later, following the Second Lebanon War, Resolution 1701 was adopted, constituting the most comprehensive international effort on this issue. It called for an immediate ceasefire, an expanded UNIFIL deployment, and the full implementation of Resolution 1559. Once again, the resolution required the deployment of the Lebanese Army from the Israeli border to the Litani River and the disarmament of Hezbollah south of that line. Predictably, this resolution was not implemented either, and the UN decisions were effectively ignored.
UNIFIL itself, established under UN Resolution 425 in 1978 immediately following Operation Litani, and whose sole purpose was to implement UN resolutions, failed to enforce them. Worse still, it witnessed Hezbollah arming and strengthening itself throughout southern Lebanon and did nothing about it.
It should already be stated here that the primary failure in enforcing UN Resolutions 1559 and 1701 rested with successive Israeli governments, which preferred to turn a blind eye despite clearly observing Hezbollah’s military buildup and the lack of enforcement by the Lebanese government.
Furthermore, in 2022, the Government of Israel signed the maritime gas agreement with the Government of Lebanon, resolving the maritime border dispute. The agreement, brokered by the United States, also formalized Israeli control over the Karish gas field. The Israeli government believed that the arrangement would remove the threat to the Karish platform and strengthen stability along the northern border, which was then in deep crisis. In practice, Hezbollah presented the agreement to the Lebanese public as the result of the military pressure it had exerted, and the agreement ultimately strengthened the organization politically and domestically.
On October 7, Hamas launched its murderous attack from the Gaza Strip. The Israeli government feared a coordinated assault from the north as well and evacuated all communities along the northern border due to concerns over infiltration and missile attacks from Lebanon.
Until September 2024, the Israeli government sought to focus on operations in Gaza and the return of the hostages. In practice, it took no action against Hezbollah, partly because of a genuine concern about an attack and infiltration similar to Hamas’s assault in the south, this time targeting residents of northern Israel.
On September 23, 2024, Israel began its offensive against Hezbollah in an operation codenamed “Northern Arrows.” On September 27, 2024, Hassan Nasrallah was eliminated, and on October 1 of that year, the IDF commenced its ground incursion into Lebanon.
At the end of 2024, after approximately 34 days of warfare between Hezbollah and Israel, understandings were reached through American and French mediation to reduce the fighting, once again based on UN Resolutions 1701 and 1559. These arrangements included the deployment of the Lebanese Army south of the Litani River, the dismantling of Hezbollah infrastructure, and the prevention of weapons smuggling. Within less than two months, Hezbollah had violated the arrangement.
Lebanon Cannot Function Without the Shiites
In August 2025, the Shiite bloc withdrew from the Lebanese cabinet in protest against the very discussion of disarming Hezbollah. The government continued to function formally, but it lost the political legitimacy of any decision made without Shiite participation. When five Shiite ministers left the government, there was no longer a functioning Lebanese government. What remained was a bureaucratic mechanism that continued discussing the issue without ever deciding it. That was precisely what Hezbollah wanted.
The words repeatedly used by Lebanese politicians throughout this period were “dialogue” and “national consensus.” In the Lebanese political system, these are code words for “non-decision.” Dialogue means endless postponement; national consensus means a veto for every political faction. When the new president, Joseph Aoun, insisted in January 2026 that “there will be no civil war in Lebanon,” he was telling the truth. But in doing so, he was also declaring that Hezbollah would remain. No alternative exists without the use of force, and no one is willing to employ it. In February 2026, the Lebanese government announced that it could not meet the Israeli demand to dismantle Hezbollah within the established timetable. It was yet another act in a performance that has been repeating itself for forty years.
The problem is that this time it happened after the Israeli government had returned the residents of northern Israel to their homes following the long war that began on October 7, 2023, while promising that there would now be peace and quiet in the north. That promise was not fulfilled. Hezbollah, immediately after the launch of Operation Rising Lion, and naturally in coordination with Iran, began a massive barrage against various areas in northern Israel, including Haifa. The attacks forced millions of residents to remain in shelters and protected rooms for more than forty days, until the current ceasefire took effect.
It is convenient to blame the Lebanese government for a lack of will, cowardice, or insufficient courage. This conciliatory explanation is misleading. The real problem is that many people in Lebanon do not want Hezbollah to be dismantled. And even if they do, they cannot achieve it. The reason lies in Lebanon’s unique social and political structure.
Lebanon’s population consists of approximately 30% Christians, 30% Sunni Muslims, and 30% Shiite Muslims. Additional communities exist, including the Druze, but they are minorities. The Lebanese political system is based on a confessional power-sharing arrangement established under the Taif Agreement: the president is a Maronite Christian, the prime minister is a Sunni Muslim, the speaker of parliament is a Shiite Muslim, and parliamentary seats are divided equally between Christians and Muslims, with 64 seats allocated to each side. Within this framework, Hezbollah is not merely an armed organization. It is a legal political party with significant parliamentary representation and has participated in every government since 1992. In the 2022 elections, it and its ally Amal won 62 of the 128 parliamentary seats. Since 2005, Hezbollah has held at least three ministerial positions in every government, a one-third minority sufficient under the Taif framework to block any decision. This is known as the “blocking third.”
In other words, under the rules of the Lebanese state itself, any decision to dismantle Hezbollah requires Hezbollah’s own consent. This is a structural paradox that cannot be overcome through negotiations. The Lebanese prime minister may sign any document proposed by the Americans or the Israelis, but he is neither authorized nor capable of implementing it.
A second and equally critical problem is demographic. In southern Lebanon, the area from which Hezbollah operates against Israel and where the Lebanese Army is expected to deploy, Shiites constitute approximately 94% of the population. This is not merely a matter of political support but of deep sectarian and familial identity. A significant proportion of Lebanese Army soldiers are themselves Shiites from southern Lebanon. An internal Lebanese report published in 2023 estimated that approximately 50% of the army’s combat forces are Shiite, many of them direct relatives of Hezbollah members.
Therefore, when the Americans, the French, or the Israelis demand that the Lebanese Army “confront” Hezbollah in the south, they are effectively demanding that Shiite soldiers use armed force against their own brothers, cousins, and neighbors. The realization of such a scenario would mean the collapse of the Lebanese Army and the renewal of civil war. Army Commander General Rudolph Haykal made this clear in March 2026 when he refused to enforce Lebanese government decisions after Hezbollah dragged Lebanon back into war. He was not acting out of personal defiance. He acted from the understanding that if the army were ordered to do so, it would simply disintegrate.
Moreover, the sectarian conflict runs so deep that, in reality, it has never truly ended since 1974, and it intensified further after Hezbollah’s establishment in 1982. In this context, it is important to note that every president or political figure who attempted to reach an arrangement with the Israeli government was assassinated. Among them were the Christian presidents Bashir Gemayel and René Moawad, as well as Pierre Gemayel (a Christian minister at the time), Dany Chamoun (Christian), Rafik Hariri (Muslim), and Kamal Jumblatt (Druze). It is therefore no coincidence that Lebanon’s current Christian president, Aoun, speaks openly of his desire to reach a peace arrangement with the Israeli government while simultaneously insisting that he will neither speak with nor meet Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. He clearly understands that such a meeting would amount to a death sentence for himself.
The Lebanese Army’s Budget Is Smaller Than Hezbollah’s
Beyond the political system and the military, Lebanon itself is a collapsing state. Since the 2019 crisis, the Lebanese pound has lost approximately 98% of its value, the banking system has collapsed, electricity, water, and sanitation services have deteriorated dramatically, and fewer than one-third of the population receives a continuous supply of basic government services. Lebanon’s total defense budget in 2025 stood at only about $800 million, leaving the Lebanese Army entirely dependent on foreign assistance: $434 million from the United States, $60 million from Qatar, and hundreds of millions of additional dollars from France, the United Kingdom, and various Arab states.
By contrast, Hezbollah, funded directly by Iran at an estimated $700 million annually and supported by a parallel economic network (“Jihad al-Bina Foundation,” the “Martyrs and Wounded Institution,” and an independent social welfare system), operates with an autonomous budget larger than that of Lebanon’s Ministry of Defense. This is no longer merely a “state within a state,” as it is often described. It is a state that functions more effectively than the state in which it operates. A government that cannot provide electricity to half of its citizens has no realistic chance of dismantling a successful armed organization possessing approximately 200,000 rockets and missiles.
Even if, theoretically, Lebanon possessed the means to dismantle Hezbollah, Iran would still be standing directly behind it. Hezbollah is not a Lebanese project that gradually became dependent on external support. From its inception in 1982, it has been a project of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Iran provides most of its funding, all of its military technology, including Kornet missiles, cruise missiles, and drones, as well as its strategic guidance and religious-political legitimacy. As long as Iran exists and wishes Hezbollah to exist, Hezbollah will continue to exist. This is an axiom that cannot be circumvented in Beirut.
The negotiations between Israel and Lebanon ignored these basic realities. They treated Hezbollah as though it were an internal Lebanese actor that the regime in Beirut could somehow “manage,” whereas in reality it is the forward arm of an external power that many Lebanese themselves fear. Demanding that the Lebanese government dismantle Hezbollah is akin to demanding that the City of London defeat Hamas. Good intentions may exist, but there is no capability whatsoever.
A Pause, Not an End
The lesson Israel must draw is not pessimistic but realistic. Diplomatic negotiations with Lebanon were not an effective tool in 1983, nor in 2004, nor in 2024, nor in 2026. They will not become effective in 2030 or 2040 so long as Lebanon’s internal structure remains unchanged. Agreements with Beirut amount to declarations of intent by a third party rather than binding commitments by the party actually confronting Israel. Hezbollah undertakes no obligations, and Lebanon cannot undertake obligations on its behalf. Moreover, agreements or arrangements with terrorist organizations, particularly those committed to Israel’s destruction, are not worth the paper on which they are signed.
Anyone who understands these realities understands that a ceasefire agreement with Lebanon should not be presented as a diplomatic achievement. These are merely agreements of postponement. Secondly, realistic expectations must be established. The objective cannot be “the dismantling of Hezbollah by the Lebanese state,” because as long as a single Hezbollah fighter remains armed, Hezbollah has not been disarmed. Therefore, the objective must be absolute security for the residents of northern Israel and the complete cessation of all forms of rocket and missile fire against Israel.
This can be achieved in two stages, naturally following the expected failure of negotiations. It should first be noted that an unprecedented historical situation has emerged in which the United States stands shoulder to shoulder with Israel in the war against Iran, as demonstrated both in Operation Rising Lion and in Operation Roar of the Lion. During these operations, Iran’s air force and navy were effectively neutralized, the majority of its weapons-production and nuclear infrastructure was destroyed, and key members of the leadership and leading nuclear scientists were eliminated. As a result of these operations, it is entirely clear that Iran’s economic and military position has been dramatically weakened. These circumstances have direct implications for the conflict with Hezbollah, given that Hezbollah is Iran’s proxy in Lebanon and that Iran is both its principal financier and the source of its ideological foundation.
There Is Something That Can Be Done
Therefore, in the first stage, it is important for Israel to seize territory in Lebanon for security purposes and demilitarize it of all inhabitants. This would create a security zone similar to the Yellow Line in Gaza, with the aim of preventing friction with the local population and eliminating the immediate threat to the lives of IDF soldiers. The demilitarization should initially be carried out by the Israeli Air Force in order to avoid exposing IDF troops to the risks of a ground invasion. At the very least, the area should initially be demilitarized up to the Litani River line, as envisioned under UN Resolutions 1701 and 1559.
Thereafter, depending on circumstances, the security zone should be expanded to the Zahrani River line in order to prevent weapons smuggling. Unlike in the past, the objective should now be the seizure of territory for security purposes while completely depopulating the area and demolishing homes in all Shiite villages under Hezbollah’s control. Serious consideration should be given to policy regarding the Christian villages located between the border and the Litani River, most of which are considered pro-Israeli, including the towns of Rmeish, Ain Ebel, Debel, and others.
Simultaneously with the first stage, Hezbollah’s sources of financing must be eliminated. These sources have already been significantly weakened as a result of the war with Iran. However, like any terrorist organization, the campaign against Hezbollah must also focus on its financial infrastructure. In addition, in order to prevent Hezbollah from smuggling weapons and missiles into Lebanon, and given that significant weapons and missile smuggling continued even after the 2024 ceasefire, it is essential to impose a maritime and aerial blockade on Lebanon and to seek ground control over the border with Syria, or at the very least to coordinate with Syria in order to prevent weapons transfers to Hezbollah.
The second stage requires American involvement, similar to the Gaza model: the establishment of a Yellow Line in which the territory is demilitarized as described above, together with the implementation of the authority of the International Council under President Trump’s leadership, with the primary objective being the cessation of missile fire against Israel and the dismantling of Hezbollah’s military, economic, and social power.
It should be stated openly what became clear in April 2026: those who presented the November 2024 ceasefire agreement to the Israeli public as a historic breakthrough were mistaken. Not because unforeseen events occurred, but because the negotiations between Jerusalem and Beirut failed for the precise reason that the representatives from Beirut did not truly represent Beirut; they represented a broader consensus that also incorporated Hezbollah’s veto power. Attempting to derive a meaningful agreement from such representatives is, at its core, an exercise in wishful thinking. At worst, it misleads the Israeli public and creates expectations whose inevitable disappointment generates unnecessary internal disputes.
The Bottom Line
History has demonstrated the same reality six times. April 2026 was the seventh instance, and it is clear that it will not be the last. This time, however, there appears to be a historic opportunity whose return cannot be taken for granted, embodied in cooperation between Israel and the world’s most powerful military. It is time to stop creating illusions for the Israeli public, and especially for the residents of the north, that an arrangement with the Lebanese government is practical or achievable. Such statements serve only to buy a little more time and an illusion of calm. The unique and historic circumstances must be utilized to their fullest extent in order to defeat Hezbollah once and for all and ensure genuine security for the residents of northern Israel and for Israel as a whole.
