Alongside the seven battlefronts faced by the State of Israel, there is another campaign no less critical—the battle for hearts and minds. Unfortunately, it has become clear that the horrors of Hamas’s terror attack on October 7, 2023, caught Israel unprepared in the arena of public diplomacy as well. Nearly two years into the “Iron Swords” war, in the face of additional fronts and combat challenges, the difficulties and obstacles in securing international understanding and support are mounting. Yet, the Israeli government has not managed to address or provide a real solution to this issue seriously.
There is a glaring, persistent, and worsening gap between the magnitude and scope of the Hasbara and consciousness challenges, and what appears to be a neglect of the matter, a lack of resource allocation, absence of decision-making processes, no structured and meaningful public diplomacy mechanism, and no unified effort among all relevant bodies. While this gap is the product of decades-long neglect, what will it take for decision-makers not only to grasp the severity of the situation but also to decide on establishing an effective and coordinated national Hasbara system?
Countless scathing reports by the State Comptroller have been written over the years, and the following report on current Hasbara failures is already in advanced stages of development. Yet, this failure must not be allowed to continue. The price we pay for this complacency and ineptitude is heavy and far-reaching, both in diplomatic terms and in our relations with Jewish communities around the world. It is crucial, necessary, and urgently imperative to prioritize addressing this issue and advance a national Hasbara program without delay.
The Gap Between Reality and Perception
Israel has been dealing with increasing intensity since October 7 with a flood of disinformation, hostile propaganda, distorted content, and a biased global discourse. Even when the facts are on Israel’s side, even when its actions comply with legal and international principles, the impact on global public opinion is often marginal. In a reality where narratives outweigh facts, Israel fails to establish broad legitimacy for its actions, and the failure stems not from an isolated incident but from long-standing structural weakness.
At present, Israel’s Hasbara is managed (or more accurately—merely conducted) by a multitude of bodies: the IDF Spokesperson, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Government Press Office, the Public Diplomacy Directorate in the Prime Minister’s Office, ministers and politicians on social media, and private new-media consultants. In this situation, conflicting messages, differing goals, and the absence of a unified strategic vision prevent effective responses to communications crises, such as the incident earlier this month in Gaza, where civilians were killed by IDF fire at an aid distribution point. Each body operates according to its own methodology, unique media priorities, and different target audiences, without coordination or hierarchy. This is not just a management issue but a fundamental failure in realizing a national interest.
There is no shortage of historical examples of individuals who performed their duties faithfully and effectively. For instance, during the Yom Kippur War, Maj. Gen. (res.) Aharon Yariv was appointed Minister of Information. Yariv was regarded as a professional and strategic figure who acted out of a sense of national responsibility. He succeeded in consolidating the Hasbara effort, creating unified messaging, and coordinating between the security establishment, the government, and the media. His example illustrates, especially in these times, the need for national, non-political leadership in the field.
State Comptroller Reports: Warnings That Went Unheeded
As noted, for three decades, reports by the State Comptroller have pointed to deep gaps in the field of public diplomacy and identified a series of recurring failures: lack of coordination between bodies, absence of legislation and institutional infrastructure, failure to implement past lessons, and the abandonment of the field to improvised responses during crises.
A summary of the key findings from recent years highlights the severity of the problem. As early as 1992, the Comptroller recognized the need for a coordinating body for Hasbara, given the absence of an active Ministry of Information. In 2007, a report on emergency Hasbara stated that there was a lack of coordination, fragmentation, and an absence of policy. Two years later, analyzing the lessons of the Second Lebanon War, the Comptroller wrote about conflicting messages and unpreparedness in the battle for public perception, noting that the Minister of Information at the time was appointed without proper resources for the task.
In 2012, the Comptroller concluded that the national Hasbara apparatus suffered from a lack of budget and authority. Three years later, he pointed to the non-implementation of recommendations from previous reports (“the field of Hasbara is in decline,” as he put it). In 2021, following Operation “Guardian of the Walls,” it was determined that the Hasbara effort suffered from a fundamental cognitive failure, fragmentation, and lack of coordination. In 2023, an interim audit of Hasbara’s performance during the “Iron Swords” war identified deficiencies in media response and ineffective functioning of the relevant bodies.
Although Ministries of Information have been established in the past and ministers appointed to the role, no professional and stable institutional framework has been anchored. This ministry often operated based on political considerations, without a professional cadre, an independent budget, or regulatory legislation, creating a reality in which temporary bodies rise and fall, causing continuous damage to Israel’s cognitive continuity.
Civil Initiatives: An Untapped Resource
With the outbreak of the “Iron Swords” war, impressive civilian initiatives emerged to champion Israeli Hasbara, such as a volunteer team of dozens of former intelligence community members operating from the Intelligence Heritage Center at Glilot. However, despite the war fostering some coordination and cooperation between public bodies and civilian initiatives to generate content and respond to international arenas, this positive trend quickly dissipated. In the absence of an institutional anchor and governmental support, many initiatives faded. While other initiatives emerged in their place, this is a recurring pattern in crises—individual citizens and civil society organizations wish to contribute and assist. Still, there is nobody capable of harnessing this potential.
This phenomenon was also reflected in remarks made by Moshik Aviv in June 2024, after he resigned from his role as head of the National Hasbara Headquarters. He described a reality of no budget, no authority, and lack of backing, symptomatic of a systemic crisis. Even when a dedicated unit is established, it does not receive the necessary conditions to succeed, and every attempt to create a national Hasbara body has thus far failed due to the same recurring flaws: inconsistency, lack of vision, and absence of political backing.
The Battle for Perception: A Strategic Pillar
To address the public diplomacy challenges of the 21st century, especially in a complex arena like Israel’s, an institutional, professional, and legal body must be established—a National Hasbara Authority that will operate under law and have authority vis-à-vis government ministries. Such an authority should be headed by a National Hasbara Commissioner—a professional appointment, free from political considerations, similar to the Civil Service Commissioner. The authority would operate an active digital operations center with a monitoring and content distribution unit that runs around the clock, regularly integrating civilian experts, including media professionals, academics, intelligence veterans, linguists, and new media specialists. It would have an independent, multi-year budget, formulate a clear national Hasbara policy, set targets, define target audiences, and establish regulated rules of engagement.
In conclusion, it is crucial to understand that the perception battle is not merely a media endeavor—it is a strategic pillar of success. Abandoning the field of Hasbara means relinquishing one of the key tools for shaping the diplomatic and public environment in which Israel operates. Just as we would not leave the country’s skies unprotected without a security Iron Dome, so too we must not abandon the cognitive arena. A professional, stable, national body must be urgently established to defend Israel in a hostile, sophisticated, and relentless information environment.
