As an experienced statesman who has dominated decision-making in Ankara for over two decades, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan understands the game’s rules. When a domestic problem in Turkey escalates, he pulls out the foreign relations card to cover it up. Rising unemployment? A collapsing economy? Kurdish pressure? Forget about it—there’s a more urgent issue in foreign relations! And once again, the imagined problem that Erdoğan is bringing to the forefront is us.

This sociological phenomenon is likely unique to Turkey, a country still living on the fumes of the Ottoman Empire’s former glory. Despite all economic hardships, ordinary Turkish citizens still attribute great importance to Turkey’s image on the international stage and wish to see it as a “global player”—as the Turkey of Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent’s era. If not through actions, then at least verbally, the Turkish president fulfills their aspirations. Having internalized this approach, Erdoğan ensures that he speaks out on every international issue as if it were the most critical matter affecting the daily lives of Turkish citizens. And, of course, these issues are anything but.

This was also the case on November 13. While returning from the climate summit in Azerbaijan, Erdoğan spoke with journalists close to him on the presidential plane. Proactively, he was “asked” several questions about his stance on various topics. Israel featured prominently in his responses, as expected in this setting and as part of this strategy. Like an autopilot, Erdoğan reiterated familiar aggressive statements against the Israeli government and threatened legal action at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague. Indeed, in early August, Turkey joined South Africa’s lawsuit against Israel at The Hague, accusing it of committing “genocide.”

In an interview with the newspaper widely considered a government mouthpiece, Yeni Şafak, Erdoğan was asked about his stance on trade relations with Israel. He replied that he had no intention of improving relations and offhandedly remarked that “Turkey has severed ties with Israel.” Whether intentionally or unintentionally, Erdoğan responded to a question about trade relations with Israel and stated that ties had been severed—without explicitly clarifying that he was referring solely to trade relations. Unsurprisingly, many commentators quoted this response out of context and inferred that all ties between the countries, including diplomatic relations, had been severed.

It is worth noting that Turkey unilaterally decided last April to terminate trade relations between the two countries gradually. This process began with imposing trade restrictions on 54 products, including cement and steel, that Turkey exported to Israel. By May, trade relations between the two countries, which stood at $9.5 billion at the time, had been completely severed.

“Beyond its interests in exerting control and influence through the Palestinians and Islamic holy sites, Turkey certainly does not underestimate the billions of dollars it earns from its indirect trade ties with Israel”

Slamming the Main Fuel Line While Opening a Window

At the same time, trade relations between Turkey and what it calls “Palestine” have surged by 180%, as journalist Dean Shmuel Elmas reported in Globes. In other words, goods are being shipped to a country that does not exist to shell companies, and after some paperwork at the port, they reach their proper destination—Israel. This way, Erdoğan presents a story to his people while avoiding harm to Turkish exports.

The opposition attempted to expose the bluff and bring the issue to light. However, on November 1, Turkish Economy Minister Ömer Bolat dismissed all claims regarding trade relations with Israel. Furthermore, Ankara asked the Palestinian Authority to weigh in on the matter. On November 4, Palestinian Economy Minister Mohammad Al-Amour addressed the media, expressing the PA’s “gratitude” to Turkey for maintaining trade relations through Israeli ports.

From this, we learn that Turkey is not interested in losing its access to the Palestinian Authority. Unlike Iran, and thanks to its full diplomatic relations with Israel, Turkey maintains a presence in PA territories and even in East Jerusalem through both governmental and non-governmental organizations such as TİKA, the Red Crescent, and the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet). Through these channels, Erdoğan expands Turkey’s “soft power,” internally translated in Turkish politics as first-class public relations efforts. As a “son of the Ottoman sultans,” the neo-Ottoman ideology compelled him to act on behalf of the “oppressed” in territories that were once under the empire’s rule.

Beyond the West Bank and Jerusalem, Erdoğan also has intentions regarding the Gaza Strip. Before the outbreak of the war, Turkey was able to send humanitarian aid through Ashdod Port. However, Israel’s control over the Philadelphi Corridor limits Turkey’s ability to reach Gaza through Egypt without passing through Israel. Turkey is undoubtedly eager to participate in Gaza’s reconstruction “the day after.” Therefore, it understands that entirely severing ties with Israel would effectively cut it off from Gaza and the Palestinians.

Erdogan at a rally in support of the Palestinians: ‘Provides the narrative for his people while not harming exports’
photo: thomas koch / shutterstock.com

Connection Is Control, and Control Is Not Easily Relinquished

In addition to these interests, it is essential to note that severing diplomatic relations is not characteristic of Turkey’s diplomatic style. Unlike Iran, Turkey does not entirely cut ties. The most prominent example is the Republic of Cyprus. Since the Turkish invasion of the island in 1974, Turkey has refused to recognize the Republic of Cyprus as a sovereign state. Ankara calls for the island’s division between the Turks residing in the north and the Greeks in the south. On paper, Ankara does not recognize Nicosia. However, there is a significant gap between these public statements and reality. Despite its non-recognition, Ankara does not take a firm stance. While it appears to be in diplomatic disconnection with Cyprus, it maintains dialogue with Nicosia through the entity it established—the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.”

For example, Ankara issues entry visas at the airport for holders of passports from this “unrecognized” state, which it refers to as the “Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus.” Furthermore, Turkish sports teams compete against Cypriot teams, including competitions held in Cyprus. This is the essence of Turkish diplomacy—connection is control, and therefore, it is unwilling to sever ties.

Similarly, Turkey uses the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus to conduct trade with Cyprus, just as it now maintains trade relations with Israel via the Palestinian Authority.

The “disconnection” between Turkey and Cyprus allows it access to Cyprus, but severing ties with Israel would mean a total loss of access to the Palestinian Authority and, just as importantly, to the holy sites in Jerusalem. Ankara cannot afford that. Beyond its interests in exerting control and influence through the Palestinians and Islamic holy sites, Turkey certainly does not underestimate the billions of dollars it earns from its indirect trade ties with Israel, which remain possible due to its continued connection with the Palestinian Authority.

Thus, despite all the harsh statements and the formal severance of trade relations on paper, Turkey will not be able to afford to cut diplomatic ties with Israel. Such a move would limit Turkey’s influence in the Middle East and complicate its relations with the United States, particularly under President Donald Trump.

A Turkish cartoon from 2011: ‘Turkey will not be able to afford severing diplomatic ties with Israel’