Over the past year, almost without notice, Jordan outlawed the Muslim Brotherhood movement, a step that signals not only an internal confrontation between the regime and the Islamist current that has been organized in the country for many years, since 1945, but also an attempt to mark a profound turning point in the regional balance of power. Jordan’s decision does not occur in a vacuum; it is intertwined with broader struggles for influence in the Middle East, foremost among them Erdoğan’s effort to reestablish regional influence through ideological networks and movements associated with political Islam, under Turkey’s strategic umbrella with Ankara at its center.
From Amman’s perspective, the move is intended to create a clear buffer between the state and extra institutional centers of power that threaten its internal cohesion and political stability. Yet from a broader regional vantage point, it also constitutes a political message: an attempt by the Hashemite regime to clarify that its sovereignty is not subject to negotiation, neither with transnational ideological movements nor with regional powers seeking to shape the kingdom’s internal agenda. Thus, the declaration is not merely an internal security measure but another link in the struggle over the character of the Middle East: between nation states seeking to preserve stability and sovereignty, and regional ideological axes aspiring to reshape the political space through cross border social and political movements. Turkey under Erdoğan is undergoing an ongoing and troubling process of empowerment, with aspirations of imperial expansion in the Middle East, emerging as a rising power alongside Iran.
Change as a Microcosm of a Regional Reflection
A legal change or the outlawing of a movement is not merely a technical step within the domestic arena; it often serves as a mirror of deeper transformations across the Middle East. When a regime chooses to restrict or ban the activities of an ideological movement, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, it signals a renewed perception of threat, a shift in the internal balance of power, and an attempt to redraw the boundaries of political legitimacy. Behind the legal step lies a broader process: concern over the growing strength of opposition forces, mounting economic and security pressures, and an understanding that the stability of the Jordanian regime depends not only on military power but also on control over the public narrative. Thus, a move that appears localized within the domestic sphere quickly becomes a regional marker, evidence that states across the region are each undergoing profound changes in their own way, ranging from cautious accommodation of ideological movements to a phase of active containment, as part of a broader struggle over the political and strategic character of the Middle East.
A Concrete Event Pointing to a Shift in Trend
In April of last year, Al Arabiya reported that confessions of members of terror cells in Jordan had been uncovered; those involved admitted affiliation with the Muslim Brotherhood. The channel broadcast filmed confessions of defendants in cases involving missile production in Jordan, recruitment, training, and the operation of unmanned aerial vehicles. In the documentation, the defendants admitted to their illegal activities and to plans intended to harm national security, and confirmed their affiliation with the movement. The confessions published by Jordanian intelligence included eight principal defendants: three in the missile production case, one in the first recruitment case, two in the second recruitment case, and two additional defendants in the UAV production case.
The missile production case: the defendant Abdullah Hisham Ahmed Abd al Rahman, born in 1989, stated that his connection with the Muslim Brotherhood movement, which has been outlawed in Jordan, began in 2002. According to him, an individual named Ibrahim approached him in 2021 with a proposal to establish infrastructure for missile production inside Jordan. He was asked to travel to Lebanon, where he underwent a security polygraph examination conducted by an organizational supervisor in Beirut and subsequently received technical training in metalworking and the production of missile components in a disguised workshop. Abdullah added that they rented warehouses in Jordan, purchased CNC machining equipment, and began attempts to manufacture missile frames. He also purchased land in the al Naqira area to establish a camouflaged hangar with concrete doors designed to appear as part of the structure, in order to increase secrecy.
Another defendant, Muaz al Ghanem, born in 1990, testified that he has been a member of a Muslim Brotherhood cell since 2010. A third defendant, Mohsen al Ghanem, born in 1972, admitted that he has been a member of the organization since 1994 and served as a courier transferring tens of thousands of dollars from a foreign country to finance the secret project.
Hader Abd al Aziz, who serves as head of the Muslim Brotherhood’s administrative office in Zarqa, admitted to recruiting young people through ideological courses and security lessons. In the second recruitment case, Marwan al Huwamdeh admitted to recruiting Anas Abu Awad. Abu Awad stated that he received an encrypted phone and a USB drive containing names and passwords, and was instructed to inspect dead drops in cemeteries in Jordan for the concealment of equipment and prohibited materials.
The defendants Ali Qasem and Abd al Aziz al Haroun, an aeronautical engineer, admitted that they attempted to manufacture unmanned aerial vehicles from accessible materials. Al Haroun stated that he examined the use of compressed cardboard, inspired by Ukrainian usage, and conducted successful flight tests of preliminary models, intending to rely on his father, who has connections with arms dealers, to obtain additional components. The authorities responded that Jordanian intelligence announced the arrest of a total of 16 individuals involved in these plans, who had been under close intelligence surveillance since 2021. The cases were referred to the State Security Court. Conversely, the Muslim Brotherhood movement in Jordan denied any connection to the defendants or to the sabotage plan, describing the acts as private initiatives. In its statement, the movement emphasized that it is an integral part of the fabric of the homeland and always prioritizes Jordanian interests.
The Jordanian Kingdom Confronts an Underground in Political Disguise
The night when Muslim Brotherhood activists attempted to smuggle out and destroy documents from their offices in the heart of Amman was not merely a moment of logistical panic; it was the moment when the movement’s ideological mask was finally removed. For decades, the group sought to be perceived as legitimate, both religiously and socially, as part of the mosaic that makes up Jordanian society, yet the exposure by Interior Minister Mazen al Farrayeh painted a picture of a well oiled subversive apparatus operating in the shadows. When “political activity” is replaced by the production of explosives and experiments with devices intended to strike strategic facilities, the debate shifts from questions about the scope permitted under freedom of expression to questions of national survival. The desperate attempt to obscure traces of suspicious ties only confirms what the investigations had already established: the dismantled group chose to convert the civic space granted to it into a clandestine laboratory aimed at undermining the stability of the monarchy. This was not a matter of rogue elements, but of infrastructure designed to strike at the heart of national security mechanisms.
The Jordanian Interior Minister announced that elements of the Muslim Brotherhood movement had operated under the radar and carried out activities capable of destabilizing the governing order.
The Minister’s declaration imposing a total ban on all activities carried out on behalf of the Muslim Brotherhood and defining it as an unlawful association is not merely a legal step, but an act of necessary social immunization. By accelerating the dismantling of assets, closing headquarters, and sealing channels of publication, the Jordanian state is drawing a clear and uncrossable red line between a defensive monarchy and emerging anarchy. The kingdom, which historically allowed a degree of pluralism and the establishment of parties, now makes clear that freedom of expression does not constitute a license to undermine national unity or to establish military militias. The legal responsibility that will now apply to any affiliation with the dismantled arm seeks to sever the branches that penetrated society and to ensure that the political agenda is not bent by criminal threats. This is a battle over the character of a proper political system, in which the state is compelled to wield the force of law in order to preserve the status quo against those who viewed its security as a legitimate target for explosive experimentation.
The Turkish Axis Is Halted at the Jordanian Border
The Jordanian move does not stand alone; it represents a final line of defense against attempts by regional powers, foremost among them Turkey under Erdoğan’s leadership, to use political Islam movements as a Trojan horse deep within Arab sovereignty. If in the past the Muslim Brotherhood was perceived as a legitimate social actor mediating between ruler and public, the exposure of military infrastructure and shadowy ties in Beirut demonstrates that the movement has become an operational arm serving foreign interests. For Amman, outlawing the movement is a direct message to Ankara: Jordan is no longer an arena for spreading the vision of a renewed Ottoman empire, nor a remotely operated ideological network. By blocking the Muslim Brotherhood, Jordan is effectively draining the swamp through which regional powers seek to undermine the Arab nation state model and replace it with a supranational agenda whose foreseeable end is chaos.
Between the Hammer of Sovereignty and the Regional Anvil
In conclusion, the transformation of the Muslim Brotherhood into an unlawful association in Jordan marks a point of no return in the modern history of the Hashemite Kingdom. Yet Amman’s true test in the day after is not only security related, but strategic and perceptual: what is the King of Jordan’s capacity to prevent Erdoğan from exploiting the vacuum created? As local activists are pushed underground, Ankara waits at the threshold, ready to absorb them into its neo Ottoman network of influence and turn them into the operational arm of its imperial aspirations.
This move gains further significance when viewed within the broader regional map: as Israel stands on the front line against an immediate and existential threat from Iran and its proxies, Jordan’s stability becomes a critical line of defense for the entire moderate axis. In choosing an end to ambiguity, Jordan makes clear that it will not allow a third state, whether Turkey seeking to dominate the narrative of political Islam or Iran seeking to destabilize borders, to turn its territory into a playground. The lights that went out in the movement’s offices in Amman mark the end of a historical chapter, yet they also signal the beginning of a determined struggle over the identity of the Middle East: a space in which sovereignty and national security must prevail over underground movements disguised as parties, before they are swallowed by the expansionist ambitions of regional powers.
