Fifty-seven years ago, during the “waiting period” leading up to the Six-Day War, Israeli citizens, the IDF, and the leadership faced an existential threat of war from Egypt and other Arab states for nearly three weeks.
“An existential fear… Heavy forces advanced to our borders rapidly, posing a threat to the state like no other since the struggle for its independence,” wrote former IDF Chief of Staff Gadi Eisenkot in 2017, marking 50 years since the Six-Day War. Indeed, the anxiety and distress among the population due to the existential threat to the young state reached an unprecedented peak since the War of Independence. Since the end of last July, Israel and the entire region have once again been in an extended waiting period, anticipating responses from Iran and Hezbollah while fearing that a preemptive Israeli reaction could lead to escalation—into a regional war or even a world war. This waiting period, which began in mid-summer, was initially counted in hours, then in days and weeks, and it continues up to the writing of these lines, at the end of the summer.
However, aside from the public’s fears—both then and now—and the fact that there were disagreements between the government and the General Staff in both instances, there are more differences than similarities between the waiting period of 1967 and the current, prolonged waiting period of summer 2024 for Iranian and Hezbollah responses.
The differences stem, among other things, from geopolitical changes and shifts in Middle Eastern relations, the nature of military threats, and the balance of power. However, the fundamental difference lies in the state of mind of Israeli citizens: back then, the public was united in the face of external threats, as were the senior figures in the security establishment. Today, however, Israel is in a prolonged state of division and fragmentation—both within Israeli society and within the political leadership, as well as between the government and top military officials, between the Prime Minister and the Defense Minister, between the Prime Minister and some of his ministers, and between the ministers and the IDF Chief of Staff and senior military officials. This dispute is unfolding amid a war for the first time since the state’s establishment. For the first time, there is no consensus in Israel about the necessity of eliminating the enemy or repelling it. For the first time, Israel faces a complex situation in which the enemy not only threatens Israel but also holds a significant asset—Israeli civilians and soldiers as hostages—raising a dilemma between continuing to eliminate the enemy at the risk of their lives or yielding to its demands to save them, or at least some of them.
Then and Now: The Feeling of Existential Threat
The most striking difference between the current “waiting period” and that of 1967 is Israel’s socio-economic-security condition leading up to it. This time, it is a direct continuation of the war imposed on Israel on October 7, when the IDF and the state failed to protect Israeli citizens, with all its consequences: hostages, dozens of destroyed communities requiring reconstruction, a prolonged multi-front military campaign involving seven external arenas and terrorist attacks within Israel, tens of thousands of evacuees in the north and south, a paralyzed northern region with many residents on the brink of collapse. In the background, there is also a sharp rise in practical expressions of anti-Semitism worldwide and a confrontational diplomatic front against Israel at the UN and globally. Thus, the “waiting” of summer 2024 is effectively part of a prolonged war of attrition, burdening civilians and reservists.
Furthermore, the waiting period of 2024 is occurring against the backdrop of concerns about retaliatory actions for operations attributed to Israel—at least for the one in Beirut, for which Israel has taken responsibility—whereas, before the Six-Day War, the fear was of an Egyptian-led pan-Arab offensive initiated by Nasser, unrelated to any prior Israeli actions.
Another significant difference is Israeli deterrence, which was eroded before October 7 due to internal divisions stemming from the government’s attempts to pass judicial reforms. The controversy led to widespread protests, including instances of military refusal, which signaled weakness and vulnerability to Israel’s enemies, to the point of creating the impression of a tangible decline in Israel’s military capabilities.
Some of Israel’s recent operations against the Houthis and Hezbollah—and, according to foreign reports, also in Iran—were aimed at restoring its damaged deterrence. However, even as it seeks to rebuild this deterrent capability, internal divisions continue to undermine Israel’s ability to project strength and give its enemies hope that their continued efforts will deepen Israeli fragmentation, enabling them to achieve more significant military and political gains.
Yet, alongside the substantial differences between the two waiting periods, there are also similarities:
The sense of existential threat loomed over the public then and still does today; the sharp tensions between the political and military leadership existed back then, and the importance of securing international support was a key concern for decision-makers both then and now.
Adding to the complexity of the current situation are the more significant threats, including Iran’s progress toward nuclear armament, enhanced ballistic capabilities, the addition of drones to its arsenal as a substantial threat, and, of course, the possibilities of cyber warfare. The international system is also more complex today. Whereas the Cold War was a bipolar system (U.S. vs. USSR), today there are additional influential players, including China, the European Union, Turkey, North Korea, Iran, and more.
At the same time, Israel has dramatically improved its international standing, partly due to the Abraham Accords. A crucial new factor today is the presence of social media and the significant Islamic presence in Western countries, following immigration waves over the past decade. This has manifested in the mobilization of global public opinion against Israel, as seen in the anti-Israel protests worldwide and on U.S. campuses.
The Waiting That Led to Preparations for Mass Burial
In the summer of 1967, a prolonged sense of uncertainty enveloped the entire region. This was preceded by the “Water War” with Syria in the mid-1960s. However, from May 15 onward, with the deployment of Egyptian forces in Sinai—which, at the time, also surprised Israeli intelligence—the tension escalated. The Arab states—Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Iraq—backed, and likely even conspired, by the Soviet Union, which sought to “heat” the region to strengthen its standing in the Middle East, were preparing for a multi-front attack on Israel, led by Egypt’s charismatic leader, Gamal Abdel Nasser. As part of this, alliances were signed between the Arab states, and military preparations accelerated.
The Arab threat forced the Israeli leadership to make fateful decisions in light of the external danger. The IDF General Staff reached a position that Israel must preempt the dangerous attack. Meanwhile, Egypt blocked the Straits of Tiran to Israeli ships, and even before that, the UN withdrew its forces from Gaza and Sinai without any international entity stepping in to support Israel. All of these developments intensified the tension, increasing pressure and anxiety among the population in Israel. Up until two days before the war, Prime Minister and Defense Minister Levi Eshkol faced mounting pressure from senior military officials, led by Chief of Staff Yitzhak Rabin, who pushed for a preemptive strike from the very first stage of the crisis. Eshkol insisted on refraining from military initiative until he received a “green light” from the U.S. In the background of these decisions was the significant lesson learned from the Sinai Campaign (1956), when both the U.S. and the Soviet Union pressured and even threatened Israel, leading to the withdrawal of IDF forces from Sinai. Only a few days before the war, the head of Mossad, Major General Meir Amit, received the “green light” for action from the U.S. President.
At the time, many men were drafted into reserve duty as part of Israel’s war readiness, causing heavy economic damage to the Israeli economy. Many civilian buses were also requisitioned for military preparations, leaving commuters without transportation. Women and older people remained at home in distress, while teenagers were assigned to digging trenches. The fear and anxiety over the war’s potential outcome, with the prospect of thousands of casualties, led the Rabbinate to prepare mass graves in Ramat Gan Stadium and public spaces.
Meanwhile, voices in the public and political circles grew louder—alongside efforts to form a unity government—calling for appointing a full-time “professional” Defense Minister to replace Levi Eshkol, who was perceived as unfit to handle the looming war. As part of this campaign, a push began to appoint former Chief of Staff Moshe Dayan as Defense Minister. Levi Eshkol preferred Yigal Allon, and some even suggested returning “the Old Man” (David Ben-Gurion) to the Defense Ministry. However, a coalition ultimately formed within the emergency government established on the eve of the Six-Day War in favor of Moshe Dayan, and he was appointed Defense Minister two days before the war broke out.
Iran, which is considered Israel’s primary adversary today, is a regional power at the peak of its nuclear development and has been arming Hezbollah for years with advanced weaponry. For the first time since the Islamic Revolution, Iran also directly attacked Israel last April.
Unlike the situation in 1967, when the U.S. and Western nations were reluctant to intervene and only at the last moment took Israel’s side, this time, there is significant involvement—mainly from the U.S. and some European Union countries. However, this intervention is not limited to supporting Israel against its enemies but also involves dictating an agenda primarily focused on preventing a full-scale regional war in the Middle East. This includes securing a deal with Hamas, arranging for the return of hostages, and controlling an all-out war in Lebanon. While Israel is focused on active deterrence and preparing for any possible scenario, at this stage, there is no noticeable effort to boost public morale in Israel.
The Dramatic Shift Like Threats
In 1967, the primary challenge was dealing with conventional threats, and Iran—then an ally of Israel—was not a factor. During the Six-Day War, Israel’s main threats were conventional: regular armies, tanks, fighter jets, and artillery. Ballistic missiles did not pose a significant threat. The war was fought mainly on traditional battlefields, emphasizing air superiority and ground maneuvering.
By 2024, the threat landscape has drastically changed, with ballistic missiles now posing a central security challenge to Israel from six key perspectives:
- Range and Accuracy – Iran and Hezbollah’s ballistic missiles cover the entire territory of Israel. Their accuracy has significantly improved, posing a threat to critical infrastructure and population centers.
- Warheads – The concern over missiles carrying non-conventional warheads, including chemical or even nuclear payloads, particularly in Iran’s case.
- Quantity – Hezbollah possesses a vast stockpile of missiles, rockets, and launchers, presenting a significant intelligence and operational challenge to the IDF.
- Defense Systems – Over the years, Israel has developed advanced defense systems such as “Iron Dome,” “David’s Sling,” and “Arrow.” While these systems have proven effective, the defense challenges remain substantial, especially given the sheer volume of incoming fire and the need to counter massive barrages.
- Military Doctrine—The evolution of the ballistic missile threat has reshaped Israel’s military doctrine, which now emphasizes precise intelligence, precision strikes, and active and passive defense measures.
- Cyber and Electronic Warfare – Alongside the physical threat, cyber and electronic warfare threats have emerged, targeting Israel’s command and control systems.
Ultimately, the ballistic missile threat presents a strategic challenge for Israel, requiring massive resource investment and fundamentally altering traditional security concepts.
The International Arena: Heightened Challenges
Before the Six-Day War, Israel’s relationship with global powers was complex. While the Soviet Union supported Arab states, the U.S., under President Lyndon B. Johnson, backed Israel but was initially unwilling to guarantee its support if Israel launched a preemptive strike. Washington refused to provide Israel with military aid or assure assistance if war broke out. The Cold War and the struggle between the superpowers heightened regional tensions, with each side striving to maintain and expand its influence in the Middle East. This was also a motivating factor behind the Soviet conspiracy to instigate the war in 1967.
In 1967, Israel was relatively isolated in the regional arena. Most Arab states saw Israel as an enemy, forcing it to rely on limited alliances with Western countries. The international system was bipolar, with the U.S. and the USSR as the dominant superpowers, each supporting opposite sides in the Arab-Israeli conflict. A stark contrast can be seen in Iran, which at the time was not only not an adversary but actively engaged in extensive security and military cooperation with Israel. In contrast, today, it is nearing nuclear capability and directly threatens Israel’s existence.
Today, the situation is dramatically different. Over the years, Israel has signed peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan, and in 2020, the Abraham Accords created a new reality in the Middle East. Israel now maintains diplomatic relations with several Arab nations, including the UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco. Economic and security cooperation with these countries strengthens Israel’s regional standing and provides new allies against the Iranian threat.
Simultaneously, the international system has become multipolar, with rising powers like China and India. This dynamic allows Israel to diversify its diplomatic and economic ties and presents new challenges in managing relationships with competing global powers.
The U.S.-Israel alliance remains strong, but relations with President Joe Biden’s administration have become more complicated. Russia maintains close ties with Iran and Hezbollah, including supplying Iran with advanced air defense systems and receiving Iranian drones since the outbreak of the Ukraine war—relations that significantly challenge Israel’s strategic calculations. Iran’s progress toward nuclear weapon capability is alarming not only for Israel but also complicates the global diplomatic landscape.
Israel’s current policy must navigate increasingly complex geopolitical and strategic considerations, where every move could trigger a regional war or even a global conflict, impacting the balance of power worldwide.
The Government and the General Staff – Disagreements Then and Now
In 1967, there was intense tension between the government and the IDF General Staff, evident in joint meetings, such as when Operations Directorate Chief Ezer Weizman called out to Prime Minister Levi Eshkol: “Eshkol, give the order! The IDF is ready…” An even more precise indication of this rift was the nickname the General Staff officers gave to government ministers: “the Jews.” However, despite the escalating confrontation—which even led to allegations of a “generals’ revolt” and a supposed plan to lock Eshkol in the command bunker until he approved a war—there was unity in purpose. The public was also united on this matter, which starkly contrasts today’s situation.
The pressure on Eshkol from the senior military leadership and Chief of Staff Yitzhak Rabin increased as the waiting period dragged on. The tension peaked after Eshkol’s infamous “stuttering speech” on Kol Israel radio on May 28, 1967—a national address intended to reassure and strengthen public confidence but which, due to Eshkol’s stumbling delivery, had the opposite effect. His stuttering, however, was not due to hesitation but rather difficulty reading handwritten corrections to his speech because of cataracts affecting his vision. Nevertheless, stuttering is stuttering, translating into public fear and a lack of confidence in Eshkol’s ability to function as Defense Minister in an emergency, leading to pressure to appoint Moshe Dayan.
Despite these tensions, once the “green light” was given, the decision-making process moved swiftly, and the operational plan—prepared by the IDF years in advance, emphasizing Operation Focus and additional maneuvers—was approved.
In hindsight, despite the harsh criticism from senior military figures and the “nebach” (hapless) image that clung to Eshkol, his strategic decisions proved correct—both in securing U.S. backing before the war and in allowing reserve forces time to train and complete their preparations.
Today, the relationship between the government and the IDF General Staff is marked by ongoing tension and growing gaps since the start of the war. Alongside harsh criticism from ministers and Knesset members against the Chief of Staff and senior officers—mainly regarding the “conception”—both sides must consider complex strategic factors. The Netanyahu government faces internal and external challenges. At the same time, the General Staff remains under constant criticism—not only from political figures attacking the Chief of Staff and generals but also from reservist groups and protests condemning military conduct and decision-making processes. Adding to this is a deepening rift between the Prime Minister and the Defense Minister, which has escalated during the war, alongside calls from ministers and Knesset members to dismiss the Defense Minister amid the conflict.
These tensions revolve around a wide range of issues, including the timing and execution of operations in Gaza—such as the dilemma regarding Rafah—the question of whether to initiate a war in Lebanon, and whether to strike Iran and Hezbollah preemptively. Many political figures and public voices are calling not to wait for enemy attacks but to strike first and end the prolonged waiting period, which has become a war of attrition.
In contrast, in 1967, the dispute was not about the necessity of a preemptive strike but rather about its timing and whether to proceed without U.S. and Western backing.
Crisis of Confidence in Leadership
Existential anxiety in 1967 fostered national unity. During the war’s preparatory phase, the Israeli public felt an immediate and real threat to the state’s existence. The fear of an Arab invasion and the war’s potential outcome created a prolonged atmosphere of anxiety. A massive reserve call-up was carried out, leaving women, children, and older people at home. They, in turn, mobilized by digging trenches and stockpiling food.
Alongside the fears—or perhaps because of them—there was a strong sense of cohesion and national unity. Despite some criticism of the government and the IDF, the public largely trusted their ability to manage the situation. There was confidence in leadership.
It is important to remember that information sources were very limited back then—radio, newspapers, and word of mouth—allowing the government to control the narrative more effectively.
In the current period, persistent anxiety, deep division, national fragmentation, and uncertainty are present. Unlike the sudden threat in 1967, today’s crisis began with a gradual rise in public anxiety, leading to heightened tension and fear among many.
Compared to 1967, today’s Israeli public is much more politically and socially divided. The threats from the north and the fear of a nuclear Iran keep many awake at night. Awareness of the missile and drone threats to the home front, coupled with memories of the Second Lebanon War and previous rounds of rocket fire from Gaza and the east, have amplified civilian fears.
Social media, continuous leaks, and unreliable journalistic reports significantly influence public opinion. Sometimes, this causes mass hysteria, which complicates rational decision-making.
In the summer of 2024, there is a notable lack of confidence in both the government and the IDF’s ability to handle current challenges—stemming from disappointment and distrust following the events of October 7. At the same time, public faith in the political system has declined, further intensifying feelings of insecurity.
In the current situation, local municipalities, alongside the Home Front Command, have taken on a more significant role in providing for citizens.
Despite these complex circumstances—arguably Israel’s most challenging moment since its establishment—Israeli society has repeatedly proven its ability to endure extreme crises, developing resilience mechanisms to overcome every challenge it has faced so far. We can only hope that we will awaken, unite, and prevail when the time comes.
Economic Impacts – Then and Now
During the waiting period of 1967, the Israeli economy suffered a severe blow. The large-scale reserve draft disrupted the economy and labor market, and high defense expenditures weighed heavily on the national budget. However, the swift victory in the war and the territorial expansion that followed led to rapid economic growth in subsequent years.
The current crisis is affecting the Israeli economy much deeper and more significantly. The horrific massacre of October 7 resulted in many casualties, both killed and wounded, requiring extensive medical care and rehabilitation. Thousands were displaced from their homes and workplaces, and educational institutions were also affected. Businesses, factories, and agricultural enterprises suffered heavy damage, and since Q3 2023, Israel has recorded very low, and even harmful, per capita economic growth.
This time, war expenditures are not limited to military spending but also include very high civilian costs due to the widespread harm to civilians and property, as well as the unprecedented scale and cost of mass evacuations. Estimating the full scope of the required budget allocations is difficult. Still, as the conflict drags on, it becomes clear that the financial sums and the recovery period will be far more significant than anticipated. The prolonged uncertainty regarding the war’s duration impacts monetary policy, the interest rate Israel pays on its growing debt, its credit rating, and the level of foreign investment. Academic and other cooperative ventures have also been affected, with the full extent of the damage still unclear as long as the war continues.
Of course, as in previous wars, not everyone is losing. On one hand, there has been a drastic drop in both inbound and outbound tourism. On the other hand, supermarket chains have seen a significant increase in sales, as more Israelis than ever are staying in the country. The defense industries are also gaining strength after years in which the security establishment prioritized using U.S. aid funds to purchase American equipment rather than investing in local defense companies.
The Abraham Accords opened new economic opportunities, but tensions with Iran threaten regional stability and international trade.
The current waiting period has long surpassed the “three-week mark” of 1967. As time passes, assessments grow that Iran will refrain from an immediate response, partly due to firm warnings from the U.S. and other countries. Hezbollah, whose plans for a significant attack were thwarted thanks to precise intelligence, signaled that its retaliation is behind it—but in practice, it continues to set the north on fire in what appears to be an ongoing response. The unique situation today is that this is not a classic “waiting period” but rather a continuous conflict, with the risk of a broader escalation at any moment.
Should Israel Launch a Preemptive Strike?
Israel’s security challenges today are significantly more complex than those of 1967. Despite the continued erosion of Israeli deterrence, its capabilities and the “cost of miscalculation” are transparent to the other side. However, the complexity of the threats and the shifting geopolitical environment require deep and creative strategic thinking.
A responsible media can provide essential information and raise public awareness of necessary precautions while maintaining a sense of normalcy. Coverage of military preparations and readiness could help bolster public confidence and resilience.
On the other hand, the media can also heighten public anxiety through biased reporting, potentially undermining trust in leadership. Excessive coverage of worst-case scenarios could create unnecessary panic. In this period, the Israeli media must act responsibly—balancing the public’s right to know with security considerations, ensuring greater accuracy, filtering rumors, and preventing damaging leaks. Social media presents an additional challenge: how to manage the spread of unchecked information?
In 1967, fewer communication channels existed, allowing for greater control over information. Today, a careful balance is needed between transparency, meticulous systemic preparedness, and collaboration among all stakeholders—the military, government, media, and public.
Another problematic norm that has taken root is the frequent leaking of information from Cabinet meetings, General Staff discussions, and intelligence briefings. In most cases, these leaks likely come from individuals attempting to influence decision-making rather than maliciously endangering national security. However, even when intentions are good, the outcome is the same—if sensitive security discussions cannot remain confidential, national security is compromised.
The Central Strategic Question: Should Israel Launch a Preemptive Strike?
One of the key strategic dilemmas today is whether Israel should initiate a preemptive attack.
There are many voices within the public demanding—some for over a month now—that Israel strike Iran and Hezbollah first, particularly Hezbollah, given its impact on the northern border for the past 11 months. In light of this growing pressure and by drawing a comparison to the decision in 1967 to launch a preemptive strike through Operation Focus, I will conclude with a brief analysis of the considerations and implications.
It is true that continued waiting costs a lot and affects the civilian population, but the decision is far from straightforward.
The Benefits of Avoiding a Preemptive Strike:
- Continued patience could allow Israel to strengthen its alliance with the U.S. and maintain international legitimacy in this sensitive period.
- Further time would enable optimal military preparations and bolster Israel’s defensive systems.
- A preemptive attack could disrupt enemy plans, take them by surprise, and reinforce Israel’s deterrence image.
However, there are also significant drawbacks.
The Disadvantages of a Preemptive Strike:
- A risk of losing international legitimacy.
- A potential severe counterattack leading to regional or even global war.
- Retaining the enemy’s threat capacity (missile and drone arsenals) could strengthen Iran and Hezbollah’s standing.
- Prolonging public anxiety and possibly further damaging Israeli deterrence.
A preemptive strike would require Israel to prepare for a full-scale multi-front war at a greater intensity than the conflicts currently being managed. Therefore, despite the severity of the situation and its consequences, it still appears wiser to refrain from launching a preemptive attack at this stage. However, it would be prudent to alter the rules of engagement with Hezbollah and coordinate with the U.S. for higher-intensity military action that would enable Israel to end the war and safely return northern residents to their homes.
Of course, such a decision would depend on real-time conditions, including military readiness, intelligence assessments, Israel’s diplomatic standing, and other factors.
