On January 12, 1955, the Olshan-Dori Commission concluded its deliberations on the “Lavon Affair” and submitted its findings to Prime Minister Moshe Sharett. This commission, established before the Inquiry Committees Law was enacted, was ostensibly meant to be a significant turning point in the history of the young State of Israel, with far-reaching consequences—not only due to its findings but also because of how it impacted the relationship between the political and security leadership and the public discourse on personal and state responsibility. But was it indeed a turning point?
Only 14 years later, the Inquiry Committees Law was passed, regulating inquiry committees’ appointment, composition, and functioning. Today, 70 years after the Olshan-Dori Commission and a year and a half after the “Iron Swords” War outbreak, there is still debate over whether to establish a commission of inquiry, what kind, who its members should be, and who should appoint them. What has changed over the years?
Let’s first return to the “Lavon Affair” and the commission formed in its wake. In the summer of 1954, members of “Operation Susannah,” a network of young Egyptian Jews recruited by Unit 131 of the Intelligence Directorate (AMAN), were arrested in Egypt. This clandestine unit, established by Benjamin Gibli, then head of military intelligence, was responsible for special operations. The wave of arrests and interrogations led to the exposure of the network. The detainees endured severe interrogations and torture, and in December 1954, a show trial began in Cairo. Alongside the network members, Max Bineth, an underground operative sent on a separate mission by AMAN, was also arrested and put on trial.
On December 29, 1954, during the Cairo trial, Prime Minister Moshe Sharett clarified that he had no prior knowledge of the network’s activities and had learned about the arrests from the newspapers. He announced the establishment of a secret inquiry committee to investigate the responsibility for the failed operation.
The commission had two members: Supreme Court President Yitzhak Olshan and former Chief of Staff Yaakov Dori. No stenographer was assigned, and no protocols were recorded. Sharett’s secretary, Shamai Kahane, documented the key testimonies—apparently at Sharett’s initiative, as he was deeply troubled by the events and the fact that he had been excluded from the decision-making process regarding the network’s operations. Additionally, the Prime Minister did not trust the Minister of Defense or the Chief of Staff, who had disregarded his directives and kept him out of crucial decisions and operations. The relationship between the military and political leadership was severely strained. Defense Minister Pinhas Lavon would later claim that the commission was formed at his request.
Sharett explained his decision to establish the commission in his diary on January 3, 1955:
“Some warned of the severe consequences… that the relations at the top of the security establishment would become so strained that cooperation would become impossible. I said that the ‘affair’ itself was already known to many; the fact of the inquiry could have been kept secret—if not for the Chief of Staff and the Director-General of the Defense Ministry spreading the news, possibly with the involvement of the Defense Minister (Lavon), each for his reasons. As for the ‘relations’—they were already completely shattered. On the other hand, delaying the inquiry indefinitely was unacceptable from a public, moral, and political perspective—above all, from the standpoint of personal responsibility, primarily mine.
I could lock away the report in my secret cabinet and refrain from concluding later. But to my knowledge, I could not accept responsibility for failing to investigate this horrific act. I was also sure that within the army itself, the fact that no one was investigating or demanding accountability for this nightmare, leaving the issue of responsibility to whispers and speculation without any authoritative determination, would corrupt what little integrity remained. At the very least, they would know that there is law and justice—that the Prime Minister sought to clarify the mystery and hold accountable those responsible for the disaster.”
The Struggle of Pinhas Lavon
On January 12, 1955, the commission published its findings, stating that Prime Minister Sharett had no prior knowledge of the affair. It also determined that Shimon Peres, then Director-General of the Defense Ministry, was unaware of all the details. However, on the central question—“Who gave the order?”—the commission failed to conclude, issuing an ambiguous ruling that amounted to a deadlock. “We are not convinced beyond reasonable doubt that the head of AMAN did not receive the order from Defense Minister Lavon. At the same time, we are not certain that Lavon indeed gave the orders attributed to him,” the commission wrote.
Defense Minister Lavon, who had been convinced after his testimony that he had persuaded the commission of his innocence, was furious. Following the commission’s findings and lacking support from the leadership of the Mapai party, Lavon submitted his resignation in early February 1955, reiterating that he was not responsible for the operation. His resignation was officially accepted in mid-February, only after David Ben-Gurion, under pressure from Mapai ministers, agreed to return as Defense Minister.
In 1960, after receiving information about forged documents, manipulated testimonies, and perjury, Lavon resumed his battle to clear his name. Prime Minister and Defense Minister Ben-Gurion initially refused Lavon’s request for exoneration or establishing a commission of inquiry. However, due to political pressure to rehabilitate Lavon’s reputation, Ben-Gurion eventually changed his stance and called for establishing a state commission of inquiry. The Mapai leadership, fearing the findings of such a commission and their potential consequences, opposed the idea.
Finance Minister Levi Eshkol, then a key figure in Mapai, proposed forming the “Committee of Seven,” which consisted of seven coalition ministers and ultimately decided to exonerate Lavon.
Ben-Gurion, who had opposed the committee, rejected its conclusions. As tensions within the Mapai leadership escalated, he resigned and ultimately stepped down for the second and final time as Prime Minister and Defense Minister. Even after his resignation, he continued to demand establishing a state commission of inquiry, culminating in the 1965 Mapai Tenth Convention.
When the Prime Minister Took Responsibility
When Prime Minister Moshe Sharett decided to appoint the two-member Olshan-Dori Commission, he did so under his authority as head of government, possibly relying on the Mandate-era Inquiry Committees Ordinance (1921), which remained in force for years after Israel’s establishment. As mentioned earlier, it was only 14 years later that the Inquiry Committees Law was enacted, regulating the appointment, composition, and functioning of inquiry committees. The law, which introduced changes to the committee’s establishment and authority, was approved by the Sixth Knesset in 1968 but was only published in 1969.
Since its approval, several amendments have been made to the law. The most significant include:
- The 1972 amendment introduced a provision allowing a committee to submit an interim or partial report. It penalized anyone who unlawfully influenced or attempted to influence an inquiry committee or its members.
- The 2005 amendment added provisions enabling restrictions on the publication of a committee’s report.
By the end of 2023, 16 state commissions of inquiry had been established under this law. One of the most well-known was the Agranat Commission, formed in 1973 to investigate the failures leading up to the Yom Kippur War. It was established about a month after the ceasefire with Egypt in response to public protests and criticism. Prime Minister Golda Meir initially opposed its formation, but under increasing pressure, the government decided to establish the commission on November 23, 1973.
The first interim report of the Agranat Commission was submitted on April 1, 1974. It did not place direct responsibility on the Prime Minister or the Minister of Defense but held military officials accountable. However, as public pressure mounted and demands grew for Meir to take responsibility, she resigned shortly afterward.
Tensions at the Top – Sound Familiar?
Several lessons from the Olshan-Dori Commission remain relevant today, though it is unclear whether they have been learned:
- The importance of a state-led investigation: As Sharett noted, the commission’s establishment recognized the need to thoroughly examine a severe security failure, especially one involving decision-making processes and senior leadership accountability in both the security and political spheres.
- Timing matters: Sharett emphasized the importance of the timing of an investigation, warning against an “indefinite postponement,” which he deemed “unacceptable from a public, moral, and internal political standpoint.”
- Responsibility: Sharett refused to allow the investigation to conclude without determining accountability for the decisions made. He wrote: ”…Above all, in terms of personal responsibility—first and foremost, my own.”
- Lack of documentation and oversight of witnesses: The absence of protocols and oversight mechanisms harmed the integrity of the process. In hindsight, it was revealed that some witnesses had lied, and at least one—Avri Elad—had been coached on his testimony by AMAN (military intelligence) and the Chief of Staff.
- The political-military divide: The “Lavon Affair” starkly illustrated the extreme tensions between the political and military leadership. The Prime Minister was openly disregarded by the Defense Minister and the Chief of Staff, while the latter also clashed with the Minister. These fractures had serious consequences, and this lesson has yet to be fully learned.
No Politics, With Consensus
Seven decades after the Olshan-Dori Commission, Israel is again engaged in a heated public debate over whether to establish a state commission of inquiry to investigate the failures leading up to Hamas’ October 7, 2023 attack. The backdrop to this debate includes eroding public trust in the security establishment and political leadership and pressing questions about personal responsibility among top government and security officials.
The debate over establishing an inquiry committee has dragged on for over 15 months since the beginning of the war. While the public and the opposition have demanded a state commission of inquiry, the government has resisted, instead favoring a committee whose composition would not be determined by the Supreme Court President and would exclude Supreme Court justices altogether. Meanwhile, public distrust in the government continues to grow, exacerbated by the firing of the Defense Minister, calls for the dismissal of the Shin Bet chief, and the Chief of Staff’s resignation announcement.
Since the beginning of the war, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has adamantly opposed the establishment of a state commission of inquiry despite numerous public demands and Attorney General Gali Baharav-Miara’s recommendation.
As a result, in July 2024, civil society organizations—including groups representing the families of the victims of the October 7 massacre—formed an alternative “Civilian Inquiry Committee.” Its goal was to investigate the actions of the government and security forces leading up to the failures of October 7.
However, because an official government body did not establish this committee, it lacked the powers of a state commission of inquiry, such as the ability to compel testimony. As a result, neither the Prime Minister, government ministers, nor security officials appeared before it; only a few public figures responded to its requests for testimony. It did not have access to classified information. After six months of deliberations and 120 testimonies, the committee summarized its findings and, in early November 2024, sent its interim conclusions to dozens of senior military and political officials for their response. On November 26, 2024, it published its final report, which included harsh criticism of the government and the IDF’s handling of events before, during, and after October 7.
The revisiting of the 1955 Olshan-Dori Commission serves as a reminder to the Prime Minister, ministers, Knesset members, and many in Israeli society who oppose a state commission of inquiry: an independent investigation is essential to restoring public trust.
In my view, and especially given the timing—15 months after the war began—it is appropriate and necessary to immediately decide on establishing a state commission of inquiry. The committee must not be a political entity. However, given the political and public divide, it would be best if the committee were formed through consensus and compromise regarding its composition. Regardless, the process must be conducted transparently, professionally, and impartially. Most importantly, It is time to learn from past mistakes and avoid repeating the failures of the Olshan-Dori Commission.