Recently, on April 3, international media highlighted Israeli Air Force strikes on Syrian military bases in Palmyra, Hama, and T4 as an unprecedented message from Israel to Turkey. The reports unequivocally stated that the Israeli operation was carried out during a “short window of opportunity” before Turkish forces were deployed to those bases. By destroying military infrastructure deep within Syria, Israel thus drew a clear red line for Ankara, signaling that Jerusalem would not tolerate any Turkish presence near its borders.
Despite the harsh initial response from Turkey’s Foreign Ministry on the same day, declaring “Israel as the greatest threat to Turkey and all the countries in the region,” it seems that the more moderate statements from the president revealed that Ankara had received Israel’s message. The next day, Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan delivered conciliatory messages to the international media and later also to domestic outlets, stating that Turkey had no intention of engaging militarily with Israel in Syria. He even emphasized opening a military communication channel to avoid unwanted incidents.
Immediately following these statements, the media reported that Azerbaijan, led by President Ilham Aliyev, considered an ally of Israel and a sister state to Turkey, would mediate between the parties in Baku. In practice, this summit became the first face-to-face meeting between the parties since the collapse of normalization between Jerusalem and Ankara on October 7. It is worth recalling that about two weeks after the war in Gaza began, Ankara decided to upgrade its pro-Palestinian stance to an explicitly pro-Hamas position.
Despite the willingness of both sides to sit at the table and find a middle ground, tensions between Ankara and Jerusalem became visible again when Turkey refused to open its airspace to an Israeli Air Force plane carrying Israeli officials to the negotiation table in the Azerbaijani capital. As a result, the Israeli aircraft was forced to significantly extend its route, eventually landing in Baku after flying over Greece, Bulgaria, and the Black Sea instead of Anatolia. It is worth noting that in November of last year, Turkey again did not permit President Isaac Herzog to fly over its territory en route to Azerbaijan.
Aerial Blockade and Diplomatic Delegitimization
In this context, contrary to its official stance regarding Israeli civilian aviation, by blocking its airspace to planes representing the “Israeli state” — such as “Wing of Zion” or “Air Force One” — Ankara is engaging in delegitimization against the Israeli leadership. It is also important to emphasize that through this airspace blockage directed at Israeli officials, Ankara demonstrates what Israeli flight routes might look like should relations between the two states completely break down.
Against this backdrop, amid the tense atmosphere between the two sides—also clearly reflected in the extended flight path to Baku—the parties have yet to reach an understanding regarding zones of influence in Syria. However, as stated by the Turkish Defense Ministry spokesperson, there appears to be a willingness to hold additional meetings to establish a joint mechanism to prevent escalation into undesirable events.
In other words, the spokesperson refrained from disclosing the core of the negotiations—namely, the division of Syria into zones of influence between Israel and Turkey—and instead presented the talks as if they were solely about establishing a communications mechanism between the two militaries.
In any case, the mechanism established between Ankara and Jerusalem will be similar to the operational model of the former Israeli-Russian channel in Syria. However, it is also crucial to stress the following difficult fact: unlike Russia, Turkey does not view Syria as a satellite state. During its presence in Syria, Putin focused solely on immediate Russian interests and was unconcerned with Syrian territorial integrity. In other words, Moscow did not prioritize “preserving Syrian sovereignty” and did not oppose Israeli freedom of action in Syrian airspace.
Ideological and Strategic Struggle on Syrian Soil
In contrast, Erdoğan’s Turkey adopts a policy opposite to Russia’s. Drawing on 402 years of Ottoman sovereignty over Syrian territory, as a leader driven by a neo-Ottoman ideology aiming to revive Turkish historical influence in all regions formerly under the empire’s control, Erdoğan cannot reconcile himself with the Israeli presence in Syria.
Moreover, beginning in 2024, while accusing Jerusalem of pursuing an aggressive foreign policy that undermines the territorial integrity of Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria, Erdoğan has, on several occasions, labeled Israel as “a threat to Turkey’s national security.” He even publicly declared that, as part of the “Promised Land” ideology, Israel is allegedly attempting to take control of parts of Turkish territory. In light of these statements, the president even led the Turkish parliament to hold an unprecedented classified debate on the matter, the details of which will be revealed only a decade from now.
Ironically, against the backdrop of these unfounded accusations against Israel, the Turkish president did not hesitate to reveal his worldview, which indeed reflects Turkey’s imperialist ambitions in the region. On December 13, the Turkish president described Aleppo, Idlib, and Damascus as Turkish provinces that were taken from the empire as a result of the harsh outcomes of the First World War.
As expected, Israel did not remain indifferent to Turkey’s declarations. On January 6, the Nagel Committee, which submitted a report to the Israeli government regarding the defense budget and security strategy, declared Turkey a “potential enemy state.”
About a week later, on January 15, the Turkish president once again chose to add fuel to the fire and escalated the situation by announcing that his country would not tolerate any Israeli presence in Syria, including the Israeli Golan Heights. As if that were not enough, Erdoğan made sure to issue another direct threat, stating that Israeli non-compliance would have “severe consequences.”
On January 22, Turkey hardened its stance even further. As a “fitting Turkish response” to Israel’s Nagel Report, Ankara published its “National Security Policy Document,” also known as the “Red Book.” In veiled language, Turkey labeled Israel as “an invasive actor that does not respect international law and destabilizes the region through wars and conquests on the lands of Gaza and Syria.”
Regional Encirclement and New Military Alliances
In light of the above, the talks to establish a military communication channel mediated by Azerbaijan can be a welcome step to avoid sliding into war. Undoubtedly, this move is desirable and aligns with Israeli interests. Against this backdrop, Israel must not leave the negotiating table without securing tangible achievements that will limit Turkey’s ambitions on Syrian soil.
However, the struggle between the two states is not confined to Syria alone. As a neo-Ottoman leader, Erdoğan and his foreign minister, Hakan Fidan, think more deeply. Both leaders view the Middle East as a Turkish chessboard and are planning drastic maneuvers that will have consequences not only in Syria but also beyond it.
The first signs of this strategy appeared on January 6, when the foreign ministers of Turkey and Jordan held a meeting in Turkey. On the surface, this seemingly innocent summit did not generate much media attention, but it bore fruit on March 9. Under a “Jordanian” initiative — as if Turkey were not the project’s principal architect — a new international platform called “Syria’s Neighbors” was established. On paper, the five countries — Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq — began cooperating militarily, ostensibly forming a joint operations wing against the terror organization ISIS.
During the announcement of this initiative, the five countries revealed their broader agenda by presenting the alliance as an effective mechanism to prevent “foreign actors” (such as the U.S.) from operating in the region. In other words, thanks to this new military alliance, the five states above are blocking the path for U.S. military activity in the Middle East.
Although this initiative was described and declared as a move against ISIS, considering the growing tension between Israel and Turkey over Syrian territory, it is crystal clear that this body will eventually turn against Israel. Looking at the map reveals Turkey’s vision plainly: a “Sunni Islamic military alliance” — a NATO-style formation — encircling Israel from the north and east.
But Turkey is not stopping with just “Syria’s Neighbors.” Recently, Turkey has begun efforts to pave Egypt’s way into the alliance. On March 29, during the Eid al-Fitr holiday, President Erdoğan called his Egyptian counterpart and asked him to “coordinate every move together” in the Middle East. If Egypt indeed joins the alliance, then Israel would be encircled along all of its borders.
At this point, it is essential to emphasize that the idea of forming a joint Islamic army is not new in Turkey. Erdoğan’s former senior advisor, General Adnan Tanrıverdi, who passed away in August last year, published numerous articles on the topic. In short, Tanrıverdi’s idea can be summarized as establishing a joint Islamic army that would include not only Sunni states but also Shiite ones, thus far more ambitious than the Sunni core of “Syria’s Neighbors.” In his articles, Tanrıverdi emphasized the importance of forming such a body to deter Israel from acting on Palestinian lands.
While Tanrıverdi’s articles mainly influenced decision-makers, Erdoğan’s mouthpiece, the newspaper Yeni Şafak, decided to bring his ideas to the Turkish public. Just days after U.S. President Trump recognized Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, on December 12, 2017, the newspaper published Tanrıverdi’s ideas in an anonymous op-ed titled “What Would Happen if an Islamic Army Were Established Against Israel?” In the article, the anonymous authors called on the Organization of Islamic Cooperation to deter Israel through tangible measures such as forming a united Islamic army and imposing a total blockade on Israel.
Today, in light of Turkey’s penetration into Syria and the unprecedented escalation between the two countries, what once seemed like a fantasy might now take shape before our eyes. Especially after October 7, Israel can no longer afford to dismiss any threat. The Jewish state must be aware of everything happening around it, keep its eyes open, and respond accordingly. As the Iranian Shiite “rings of fire” fade from Israel’s surroundings, under the fig leaf of fighting ISIS, Erdoğan’s Turkey is trying to forge new Sunni rings of fire around Israel.
Jerusalem must internalize: Turkey is more sophisticated than Iran. Unlike the Islamic Republic, Erdoğan’s Turkey is a “NATO member,” which grants it international legitimacy. Turkey’s strategy differs from Iran’s. Turkey has always promoted its interests using words wrapped in “peace.”
The “Syria’s Neighbors” initiative against ISIS is no different from any other “Turkish peace-seeking action.” The examples? Turkey’s invasion of Cyprus in 1974 is known as the “Cyprus Peace Operation.” If that seems like ancient history, consider the names and outcomes of Turkey’s military operations in northern Syria: “Euphrates Shield” (2016), “Olive Branch” (2018), “Peace Spring” (2019), and “Spring Shield” (2020). As the results show, when the Turks enter an area to ” bring peace,” they never leave that territory. Look at northern Cyprus, northern Iraq, and northern Syria.
In light of the above, Israel must prepare for Turkey’s initiative, which aims to encircle it from all borders and present a tangible military threat that could deter it in the future.
