Immediately after the horrific massacre on October 7, even laypeople understood that the heart of the war that followed lay in the deception that caught Israel off guard. I began speaking and writing about this strategic deception in mid-2024.
Deception is part of my research field called “information warfare,” which includes cyber warfare, psychological warfare, electronic warfare, media-military relations, and deception. My primary focus has been psychological warfare—a field that has seen some advancement in Israel’s security apparatus but remains far from sufficient. One of the significant challenges, and likely the main reason the field has not gained momentum, is the difficulty in measuring its effectiveness. Regardless, it is clear that Israel’s defense establishment has traditionally focused mainly on the kinetic aspects of warfare.
Unlike psychological warfare, deception does not face opposition within the security system or the public. Lying during war to achieve operational and strategic goals is a legitimate norm, even in the West. However, implementing deception is not simple, especially when it sometimes requires deceiving one’s forces as part of deceiving the enemy.
In Western countries, deception must be broadly understood by forces on the ground to avoid falling prey to manipulation. This can be learned from the U.S. Army’s deception manual FM 3-13.4, whose preface notes, “The officer in charge should never forget that the deception manual is available online…” Israel’s equivalent manual, if it exists, is likely classified. The U.S. Army’s openness in this area makes sense, as classification complicates or undermines the ability to execute tactical deception effectively. In Israel, the prevailing belief is that “secrecy is the key to security,” a mindset that dates back to the days of the Palmach and continues to influence security perceptions.
The American manual explains the components of deception through two case studies that illustrate its theoretical principles. One is the British deception operation during the Normandy invasion, and the other is from Israel’s region—the Yom Kippur War. However, as I will demonstrate, the Hamas-Iranian deception far surpasses the Egyptian deception during the Yom Kippur War in its scope.
It is important to note that deception has not changed fundamentally throughout history, and psychological warfare has not made groundbreaking changes. Both rely on the same basic principles of human cognition. Innovations in these fields pertain only to the tools available for delivering messages, not the underlying human psychology.
Psychological Warfare Is Not Deception
It is also crucial to clarify the relationship between psychological warfare (PSYWAR) and deception. The confusion stems from the fact that both fields deal with psychology. Moreover, deception tends to be viewed as a central domain and PSYWAR as a subset. This fundamental error can cause significant harm in defining forces and allocating human resources in practical implementation. Both fields use psychology and are based on delivering messages to a target audience. Like PSYWAR, deception employs persuasion techniques, causing the target audience to believe they made decisions of their own free will. Deception builds on this persuasion method.
Both PSYWAR and deception target specific audiences. While psychological warfare addresses all possible target groups—domestic audiences, the enemy, and neutral parties—deception focuses solely on decision-makers. Of course, PSYWAR can also aim to persuade additional groups to pressure the enemy’s decision-makers into adopting a reality beneficial to the deception operator. Still, the ultimate goal of deception is decision-makers.
Deception (like PSYWAR) operates schematically on three levels: tactical, operational, and strategic. At each level, the aim is to create a false perception, with messages from each level forming a cohesive puzzle tailored to the deception operators. For example, Iranian deception targeted decision-makers within the IDF, political decision-makers, and opinion leaders globally, including international media.
The most focused target audience included Israel’s intelligence evaluation mechanisms, especially the Research Division of Military Intelligence, the Shin Bet, and, to a lesser extent, the Mossad. A broader circle included civilian think tanks that analyze military issues, academia, and the media. The largest circle encompassed global think tanks focusing on the Middle East and international media.
Another principle from the American deception manual is that deception does not aim to convince people that black is white but rather to slightly darken the white or lighten the black, creating a gray area. As adults, we usually perceive reality as complex and multifaceted. Deception’s role reinforces one of these facets, leading decision-makers toward the intended goal.
One branch of deception involves concealing true intentions—a tactic referred to in early 20th-century Soviet doctrine as maskirovka. In our case, this meant concealing the massive tunnel construction project from Israel. This large-scale engineering endeavor involved enormous quantities of equipment, extensive digging, removal, reinforcement, and construction. The sheer magnitude of this project was astonishingly hidden from Israel and the world.
This concealment could not have succeeded passively; it was accompanied by the dissemination of “auxiliary information” intended to obscure the tracks and create an opposite perception of reality. This included leaked information about exaggerated difficulties in tunnel digging, low wages for workers, using minors, collapses, and other supposed failures, creating an impression of slow progress that didn’t raise the alarm.
The “Metro Affair,” in which the IDF struck a network of tunnels in March 2022, killing operatives within them, was part of this deception plan. It was portrayed, both by Israel’s defense system and the enemy, as a significant blow to Hamas’s tunnel infrastructure. In hindsight, it is clear that Hamas had an interest in amplifying the IDF’s success, labeling it a “severe blow,” even though only a tiny portion of the network was destroyed.
A significant question arising from Hamas’s successful deception is how they “disappeared” the massive quantities of earth excavated from hundreds of kilometers of tunnels. Speculation suggests, as indicated in social media that the excavated soil was sold to Israeli contractors. In other words, Israel indirectly financed this engineering project, which was ultimately designed for offensive purposes against it.
One notable historical case is that of British officer Richard Meinertzhagen during the 1917 Gaza campaign. While fleeing from a Turkish patrol, he “lost” his bag containing sandwiches wrapped in paper used for map marking. Turkish intelligence officers concluded that these were the maps for the attack plan—part of a premeditated deception operation. The lesson from this anecdote is to make the enemy “infer” something indirectly.
This principle applies to many deception campaigns, from the dummy tanks and planes used near Calais during the Normandy invasion to the operational and strategic ruses designed to mislead the enemy.
The Deception of Tens of Thousands of Professionals
In free societies, public perceptions are shaped by security agencies, government decision-makers, and hundreds of additional entities from academia and civil society that contribute to forming opinions and setting the agenda. The country’s evaluation bodies are at the forefront of this process in Israel. These include several large organizations, with the Research Division of Military Intelligence (AMAN) leading. This division is vast, divided into theaters and areas of expertise, each with its branches and subunits.
Additionally, the IDF operates other intelligence-gathering bodies, Unit 504, and research branches of the army’s ground, air, and naval forces collect information beyond Israel’s borders. Unit 8200 is a large entity responsible for signals intelligence (SIGINT), which transmits the data it intercepts and analyzes it internally. The second major evaluator is the Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency), which maintains a significant research system organized into desks focused primarily on counterterrorism. The third is the Mossad, which operates a research division with a global scope, including a focus on Israel’s immediate surroundings.
Beyond the defense establishment, there are parallel research units, including the National Security Council (NSC), which had to fight hard to establish its place in Israel’s security framework. The police intelligence unit and the Israel Prison Service intelligence arm also maintain research branches. Each entity focuses on its specific area of responsibility, but all institutional research bodies employ individuals proficient in Arabic.
Outside the defense establishment, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Political Research Department (PRD) plays a key role. It gathers information from over 100 embassies worldwide and other sources, enjoying significant prestige. Surrounding it are various think tanks led by the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), the Dayan Center at Tel Aviv University, and other academic institutions specializing in Middle Eastern studies, such as Western Galilee College. Altogether, thousands of professionals work in this field, including reserve officers of various ranks—generals, colonels, and lieutenant colonels—who conduct research, write, and lecture alongside professors and senior lecturers supported by research assistants, some of whom are fluent in Middle Eastern languages.
On a broader scale, international research bodies such as NATO’s research division, global think tanks (e.g., the RAND Corporation in the U.S.), and European academic and research institutions also play a role. In the U.K., notable research centers include the IISS, Chatham House, and the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) at the University of London and St. Antony’s College at Oxford. Similar centers exist in France and Germany. Surrounding these entities is the global media. In Israel, every major media outlet employs correspondents specializing in Arab affairs or the Palestinian territories, often more than one. Similarly, prestigious newspapers like The New York Times and The Times of London and international news agencies such as AP rely on highly experienced editors who have lived and worked in the Middle East.
A conservative estimate suggests that tens of thousands of professionals were targeted by Iran’s deception campaign—and Iran succeeded in deceiving most of them, solidifying the popular narrative that “Hamas is deterred.”
How Did the Deception Succeed Phenomenally?
It begins with simple psychology: the principle of groupthink. The concept originated during the early Cold War in an analysis of U.S. strategic thinking during the Bay of Pigs incident. How does groupthink arise? The process starts with presenting a thesis and gradually creating a growing spiral of seemingly unrelated “evidence” supporting it. In practice, this involves continuously inserting reports into the media, such as statements suggesting that Hamas and Iran are shifting focus from military activities to politics. Concurrently, alternative perspectives are politely dismissed. Later, dissenting views are ridiculed or aggressively suppressed, creating a climate where challenging the prevailing narrative becomes socially and professionally costly.
Iran has mastered this type of deception. It applied it to Hamas and continues to use it to advance its nuclear ambitions with relative ease. Such a deception campaign requires substantial human resources and centralized management. It involves a relatively large, though inexpensive, command center (in state terms), employing specialists in academia, global media, military strategy, and economics. These experts oversee media output (e.g., “exclusive interviews with Hamas representatives”), academic articles, conferences, international and local seminars, opinion pieces, and books.
These efforts create a feedback loop in the globalized world, where information flows rapidly and universally. Media outlets, hungry for 24/7 content, amplify the messages. Academics rely on archived media reports and databases. Security professionals, overwhelmed by the data in their systems, often use academic methodologies to organize and analyze the information. In short, everyone feeds into everyone else.
In Israel, there is significant overlap between individuals across these sectors. Professionals often move between intelligence, academia, media, and politics, creating what the British call an “Old Boys Network” of security thinking. This lack of intellectual challenge fosters stagnation. Over time, narratives become entrenched, and by the time students graduate from high school or university, they are fully convinced that they’ve independently discovered “the truth.”
Only a fraction of Islamic influence in American academia has come to light in the last year—a mere tip of the iceberg. Investment in Western academia dates back to the 1950s and is part of a broader strategy to plant ideas and establish platforms for disseminating messages. Some graduates remain in academia, pursuing advanced degrees or faculty positions. Others enter research institutions—civilian or military—or the media, authoring books or reports. Even investigative services for authors, researchers, and journalists contribute to the ecosystem.
A key principle of this system is its interdependence: researchers rely on academia, academia uses the media, journalists draw from academic sources, and so on. This cycle reinforces itself, creating an echo chamber.
Another aspect tied to Western organizational culture is the reluctance to challenge authority, especially in hierarchical settings like the military or academia. This culture wasn’t as prevalent in Israel until about 20 years ago. In the past, a junior officer could openly contradict a senior commander during post-exercise debriefings without fear of repercussions. Today, challenging senior officers can jeopardize future career prospects—a practice imported from U.S. military training programs.
This phenomenon is even more pronounced in Israel due to the country’s small size and tight social circles. During the Yom Kippur War, commanders refrained from acting against others, even when they knew they were wrong, because of personal connections formed in the country’s close-knit communities.
Compounding these issues is the brevity of senior military roles in Israel, which typically last only one to two years. Officers often spend additional months preparing for their next position or academic studies, and their military careers end relatively early. This structure limits professional development, organizational learning, and institutional memory.
Only a handful of underfunded Israeli think tanks, such as those led by Dr. Martin Sherman, Prof. Efraim Inbar (formerly of the Begin-Sadat Center), and David Bedein’s Middle East Research Center, can claim to have consistently challenged the prevailing narratives. Together, these factors reveal the mechanisms behind the inertia of Israeli strategic thinking.
The Dissemination of the Conception – Even in Army Radio
According to captured documents, some of which have been made public, Hamas, in coordination with Iran, began promoting the perception that it was “deterred” approximately three years before October 7. This was no small feat for an organization that openly declares in its charter its commitment to Israel’s destruction and has engaged in several military rounds against Israel since its rise to power in Gaza.
On the one hand, Hamas needed to project a militant image, infiltrating Israel through tunnels like the one used in the Gilad Shalit kidnapping, demonstrating strength with military parades and missile tests into the sea, and above all, concealing its massive tunnel-digging project. On the other hand, it had to convey messages about “the good life in Gaza,” leaking information to Israeli influencers who had no idea they were serving the enemy’s military agenda.
As mentioned earlier, this was not about flipping reality from black to white—Hamas, like other terrorist organizations such as the PLO, operates in a complex reality. Most of its personnel are engaged in combat and terrorism, but some are active in Washington through lobbying organizations like CAIR or the Holy Land Fund. Others manage financial transfers of hundreds of millions of dollars from Qatar to Gaza or onward to Egypt. It is easy to showcase “the good life,” especially when Palestinian Authority officials criticize the lavish lifestyles of Hamas leadership. It is even possible that Hamas intentionally used PA officials or collaborated with them to highlight these ostentatious lifestyles in Gulf states.
Ultimately, Hamas sought the participation of PA operatives in the October 7 infiltration into Israel, aiming to occupy Israel on an additional front alongside the infrastructure the IDF discovered in Lebanon. A preliminary review of Israeli media reports from two weeks before October 7 shows that Yahya Sinwar was still speaking about ongoing negotiations to return the bodies of Oron Shaul and Hadar Goldin from Operation Protective Edge. This reflects the technique of “habitualization”—conditioning the enemy to think along specific patterns because people naturally cling to habits. This psychological principle works well in deception and represents a significant pitfall for analysts.
Hamas and Iran exploit the fundamentally different mindsets of Westerners, including Israelis, who cannot comprehend why people, given a choice between transforming Gaza into Singapore or focusing on war and mass killing, would choose the latter. Therefore, Westerners inclined toward peace readily accept the perception that Gaza’s wealthy elite focus on wealth creation and the good life, abandoning military plans and promises to Gaza’s population to destroy Israel. Fragments of information about the Hamas leadership’s growing affluence reinforced this perception.
How Can We Think Outside the Box?
Israeli media outlets have been in contact with Hamas for many years. This was also the case during the Gilad Shalit kidnapping, which served as a precursor to the current abductions. Even on Army Radio (Galei Tzahal), Hamas spokespeople were interviewed openly in fluent Hebrew, spreading messages that “everything is normal.”
As mentioned, only a few dared to present an alternative thesis to the prevailing narrative, and in hindsight, they were proven correct. Yet, very few listened to them. One such example is a small research center called The Middle East Research Center. While the more prominent research institutions consistently erred since the Oslo Accords, David Bedein’s Middle East Research Center was accurate. It is possible that Bedein’s American accent, his kippah, and his status as a settler from Efrat led to his categorization as an outsider and the rejection of his articles by mainstream circles.
Bedein, a student of Saul Alinsky, is a third-generation American familiar with the political, social, and academic scenes in the United States. He understood the manipulation the Palestinians employed against foreign media during the First Intifada and Arafat’s duplicity during the Oslo era, but his warnings went unanswered. For decades, he tracked Palestinian textbooks, sent film crews every summer to document UNRWA school training camps, and received only occasional flashes of media attention in Israel and abroad. This demonstrates the herd mentality surrounding a conception fed by the Palestinians under Iran’s guidance.
The failure to recognize this deception and the disaster it brought upon us necessitate changes in the suffocating ecosystem of research institutions, academia, and the military. Such changes might include integrating ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) scholars and pre-military academy graduates into the Research Division and, subsequently, academia and civil society—research centers and think tanks. Haredim is accustomed to debating and generating multiple viewpoints in the unique style of Talmudic study. In their world, a learned student is allowed to challenge their teacher. Talmudic study also involves constructing and deconstructing theoretical frameworks, a skill that could significantly enhance critical and contrarian thinking (the ipcha mistabra—“the opposite is likely”—recommended by the Agranat Commission).
Yeshiva and pre-military academy students are used to handling large volumes of information as part of their routine. However, recruiting them would require creative thinking about suitable roles and working conditions. Policy papers from various research institutions in Israel and abroad should be shared with analysts in the system, with regular meetings between representatives to hear diverse perspectives.
New thinking is also needed to engage populations that frequently interact with Palestinian Arabs, such as settlers and merchants. Lessons can be drawn from the innovative and successful recruitment of the “Desert Reconnaissance Battalion,” trained to read field conditions in border areas and the West Bank.
A similar revolution occurred when hackers were recruited into the IDF, bypassing traditional demands such as shaving, uniform discipline, and strict hierarchy. These changes demonstrated the potential for flexible and adaptive approaches, which are now essential for overcoming Iran and Hamas’s intellectual and operational challenges.
