Turkey’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, appears poised to be remembered as one of the most influential figures in shaping modern Turkey, second only to the republic’s founder, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. While he has not entirely erased Atatürk’s secular legacy, he has undeniably made it more conservative over the past two decades.
This transformation did not occur overnight but was instead a gradual process. Ironically, the Turkish military, long regarded as the guardian of secularism, was the very institution that laid the groundwork for Erdogan’s rise. During the Cold War, especially after 1980, the military sought to counter the infiltration of communism into Turkish society and to unify a fragmented nation around “national values.” In doing so, it redefined religion as an integral part of Turkey’s national identity.
With adopting the ideology known as the “Turkish-Islamic Synthesis” (Türk-İslam Sentezi), religion became an inseparable element of Turkish nationalism. This worldview was ingrained in the public consciousness through education and textbooks. As a result, Ottoman history was revived and glorified at the expense of general European history. This new narrative helped reconcile the “secular republic of Mustafa Kemal” with the Ottoman Empire, which had once been the sword of Sunni Islam. The previous perception of the Ottoman Empire as a multi-ethnic, Islam-based entity was replaced with a new narrative depicting it as a “Turkish national empire.” Gradually, the Ottoman Empire, once seen as the antithesis of the secular Turkish Republic, was rehabilitated and transformed into a source of Turkish national pride.
It is worth noting that while the Ottoman dynasty originated from Turkish roots, the mothers of the sultans—except for Osman I and Orhan—were of Christian or Jewish descent. The Ottomans employed a recruitment system called Devşirme, similar to that of the Mamluks, in which non-Muslims, mainly Christians living under Ottoman rule, were required to provide a quota of young boys who were then enslaved and converted to Islam to serve the sultan.
Rewriting History Through Education and Culture
In 1999, the “700th anniversary of the Ottoman Empire” was celebrated, and despite the empire’s collapse in 1922, neo-Ottomanism spread beyond schools and into popular culture. Turkish television series, notably The Magnificent Century (Muhteşem Yüzyıl), depicted the reign of Suleiman the Magnificent, significantly reinforcing the neo-Ottoman idea.
Much like school textbooks, The Magnificent Century and other films and TV shows portrayed the Ottoman Empire as a political entity that brought only justice and peace to the territories it controlled. This cultural shift gave rise to the ideology of the “Vision of World Order” (Nizam-ı Alem Ülküsü), which posits that order, justice, and global peace can only be achieved through Turkish-Islamic leadership. In other words, this ideology aims to “repair the world” by reinstating the “Ottoman Peace” (Pax Ottomana), akin to the Roman Peace, in former Ottoman territories.
As a result, wars, victories, and vast territorial conquests across three continents became a source of national pride for ordinary Turkish citizens. Unsurprisingly, this atmosphere strengthened the neo-Ottoman ideology.
As a skilled politician attuned to societal trends, Erdogan seized this wave of sentiment. By delivering grand speeches extolling the empire, he successfully united the conservative-religious bloc with Turkish nationalists by providing them with a common denominator.
Through this carefully orchestrated blend of education, social initiatives, ideology, and charisma, Erdogan managed to maintain his grip on power for the past two decades. However, as seen in the most recent municipal elections held on March 31, 2024, public support has begun to wane—particularly among young voters who have never known another government. To capture their attention and generate excitement, Erdogan launched a new-yet-familiar vision in January last year as part of his election campaign: “The Century of Turkey.” This name was not chosen randomly—it resonates with the sentiment of the iconic neo-Ottoman series The Magnificent Century.
In a speech before the Turkish parliament, Erdogan declared this so-called new vision as the grand project meant to propel Turkey into the league of global superpowers—or, in other words, to restore its former glory.
However, an examination of the official website of this so-called new initiative reveals the president’s old ideas, merely repackaged.
Since then, Turkish foreign policy cannot be understood separately from this vision. In every election campaign he has participated in, including the most recent one, Erdogan has leveraged foreign policy as a public relations tool. Within this framework, he has elevated the concept of “independent foreign policy” to a top priority. Unlike previous eras, Turkey no longer acts as the “rubber stamp” of the West or the United States on foreign policy matters. In other words, Erdogan is demonstrating to his citizens that Turkey now conducts an independent foreign policy befitting a country in the “league of global superpowers”—akin to the Ottoman Empire.
Of course, this newfound independence has far-reaching consequences. For example, unlike the United States and other NATO members, Turkey does not unequivocally support Ukraine and continues to maintain close relations with Russia. Russian-Turkish cooperation in nuclear energy, gas, tourism, and aviation is tangible evidence of Turkey’s ambivalent stance—balancing between its NATO membership and its aspiration to act as an empire in its own right. Despite being a NATO member, Turkey did not hesitate to submit an official application to join the BRICS alliance as a full member. BRICS was established to challenge the dominance of the U.S. dollar in the global economy—essentially, an anti-Western partnership.
Foreign Policy as a Public Relations Tool
Given Turkey’s frustration over the deadlock in its EU accession process and Ankara’s disappointment with U.S. pro-Kurdish policies in northern Syria, one might assume that Turkish foreign policy is driven by strategic national considerations based on interests.
However, as mentioned, Turkey’s foreign policy is guided by the vision of “The Century of Turkey,” which is described as “partisan diplomacy based on fundamental principles” (İlkeli Taraflılık) and is considered a core component of Turkish foreign policy. As such, Turkey cannot genuinely complain about the EU’s refusal to admit it or about U.S. policies toward it.
In a speech delivered on September 20 at a government-affiliated research institute, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan even boasted about Turkey’s “unique” foreign policy. Deeply influenced by the vision of “Turkish World Order,” the minister explicitly stated that Turkish foreign policy is shaped by its values, fundamental principles, and religious beliefs. According to him, these components position Turkey in a distinct place and shape its worldview about other civilizations and nations.
Fidan’s unequivocal statement makes it clear that Turkish-Islamic justice and pan-Islamic values now constitute the fundamental pillars of Turkey’s foreign policy.
A concrete example of this can be found in Turkish President Erdogan’s book A Vision for Global Peace, in which he calls for a comprehensive reform of the United Nations Security Council. As part of this reform, Erdogan not only advocates for the inclusion of new permanent member states but also raises the issue of Turkey’s admission as a permanent member, specifically in the capacity of a “Muslim nation.” In other words, as a staunch neo-Ottoman, Erdogan envisions Turkey as the leading nation among Muslim countries, crying out for “justice” and “global correction” as the representative of the Muslim world in the Security Council.
This stance also serves as Turkey’s guiding principle in its foreign policy toward Israel. Notably, immediately after the outbreak of the war in Gaza, Turkey proposed establishing a joint guarantee mechanism with the United States aimed at ending the conflict. Through this proposal, Turkey effectively demonstrated its belief that it and the U.S. are equal global powers. In Turkish terms, a “guarantee” equates to “patronage”—a status whereby a power is granted international authority and legitimacy to impose a solution on the parties as it sees fit. For example, the guarantee agreement established at the founding of the Republic of Cyprus in 1960 paved the way for Turkey’s invasion and occupation of northern Cyprus in 1974. This was essentially the logic behind Turkey’s proposal for resolving the Israeli-Gaza conflict.
Accusations of Genocide
According to Turkey’s proposal, the U.S. and Turkey would serve as “guarantors” for Israel and the Palestinians, respectively. Thus, if Israel were to violate a “peace agreement” imposed upon it, Turkey, as in the Cyprus conflict, would have the right to intervene militarily in favor of the Palestinians.
Of course, the Turkish proposal received no official response from either Israel or the U.S., though it likely earned Erdogan political points with his domestic audience. Turkey, however, has yet to recognize that its policy of “partisan diplomacy based on fundamental principles” is the primary obstacle preventing it from becoming a key player in resolving this and other conflicts. As a result, while Arab nations—who share ethnic and cultural ties with the Palestinians—have not severed ties with Israel and continue to play a role in negotiations between Israel, Hamas, and Hezbollah, Turkey, with its staunchly one-sided stance against Israel, remains irrelevant and excluded from this diplomatic arena.
Turkey’s decision to support South Africa’s lawsuit against Israel at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which accuses Israel of committing genocide against the Palestinians, further weakens Turkey’s long-term diplomatic relevance.
Nevertheless, Ankara remains steadfast in its policy, and Erdogan’s administration continues to take an adversarial stance toward Israel. In the same speech at the government-affiliated think tank, Foreign Minister Fidan continued to accuse Israel of attempting to ignite a regional war, completely disregarding the horrific massacre of innocent Israeli civilians on October 7. Furthermore, he ignored the relentless Hezbollah rocket attacks launched in solidarity with Hamas, instead framing Israel’s sovereign military response as an act of aggression against those who initiated the attack. If that were not enough, the Turkish minister also claimed that Israel seeks to secure its place in the region solely through “genocide,” warning that such actions will ultimately backfire.
In his harshly worded speech, Fidan described Netanyahu’s government as a “fundamentalist government” that serves as an obstacle to diplomatic efforts for regional peace. He also did not hesitate to criticize the West, particularly the U.S. and Germany, attributing their support for Israel to “the Holocaust.” He further claimed that Israel no longer deserves the “immunity” it once enjoyed due to the Holocaust because, according to him, it is now committing genocide itself.
Turkey has thus made its choice—idealism over realism—a decision that renders it irrelevant on the global diplomatic stage but fills the Turkish people with national pride, thereby securing Erdogan’s rule as he positions himself as the reviver of the great Turkish nation and empire. Of course, even without this new ideological vision, one could not expect Turkey to be pro-Israel or a Zionist sympathizer in this war. However, it could have remained silent or offered nominal support for the Palestinians while maintaining its diplomatic relevance in the Middle East.
Instead, Turkey’s consistently antagonistic policy is repeating the same mistakes that damaged its relations with Israel over the past decade—ties that had only recently been rebuilt after years of estrangement.
Now, relations have plunged to a new low: direct flights between the two countries have been halted, as have most of their once-thriving economic ties. The damage has already been done, making it unlikely that relations will return to their previous level soon. Trade relations and financial and diplomatic frameworks have been dismantled rapidly and cannot be rebuilt as quickly.
