The motivation of West Bank Palestinians, both as individuals and through their various organizations, to carry out terrorist attacks remains unchanged. Around this motivation, terrorist infrastructures continue to develop and establish themselves on the ground, alongside the recruitment and training of operatives both within the region and beyond. In response, the IDF and the Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet) are compelled to develop counterterrorism mechanisms and increase their presence, particularly in the many friction zones between the Jewish and Arab populations in the West Bank, especially in refugee camps whose characteristics resemble those found in Gaza.
These risks are compounded by the weakness of the Palestinian Authority and its lack of legitimacy, as well as the dire economic conditions facing the local population, the extremely high unemployment rates, particularly among educated young people, and the absence of any political horizon. Added to this already complex and volatile reality are Jewish extremists who respond to Arab terrorism and tensions through nationalist criminal violence.
Nationalist extremists among West Bank Arabs exploit religion and Islamic faith to inflame passions. The fact that the war against Iran has not yet reached a definitive conclusion further fuels emotions and raises hopes among terrorist organizations that they too can drag Israel into a prolonged conflict that will generate despair among its citizens.
Judea and Samaria constitute a sensitive and explosive arena, both because of the large Jewish population residing there and because of the topography and geography. The mountainous terrain overlooks Israel’s major urban centers and population concentrations, while the physical proximity between terrorist strongholds and Jewish communities creates a direct security challenge. Under such conditions, a substantial portion of Israel’s territory faces a genuine threat to its civilian rear.
As we have learned through painful experience, Palestinian motivation to carry out terrorist attacks against Israel is the greatest risk factor. Their ability to further develop their capabilities, including drone threats and the danger of Palestinian Authority security personnel turning against the system, indicates that time is not working in Israel’s favor.
The recent decline in the number of attacks is nothing more than a dangerous illusion. While it undoubtedly reflects a significant and commendable achievement by Israel’s security forces, the enormous number of thwarted attacks testifies to the level of motivation, the depth of terrorist infrastructure, its geographic spread, and its audacity throughout Judea and Samaria.
Although Palestinian society is not sufficiently organized and remains deterred, partly due to changes in the operational patterns of Israeli security forces, including methods reminiscent of IDF operations during the “Swords of Iron” war in the Gaza Strip, a range of variables could cause the Palestinian public to cross the threshold of fear and deterrence, creating the conditions for a broad violent uprising that could extend beyond the boundaries of the West Bank arena.
The expansion of violence and nationalist criminal activity by Jews is also deeply troubling, not only because of its potential to accelerate a wider outbreak of violence, but also because it blurs the boundaries and norms of a state governed by the rule of law, particularly regarding conduct toward the IDF, law enforcement agencies, and state institutions. Furthermore, the drift away from Jewish moral values and toward norms of violence damages the quality of governance in Israel and harms the country’s image and international standing.
Rising Motivation for Terrorism
Since a wave of violence and terrorism erupted in the West Bank in March 2022, following two terrorist attacks in Israel carried out by Israeli citizens identified with ISIS, Israel has been engaged in an ongoing war against terrorism. The violence initially centered in northern Samaria before gradually spreading to the rest of the West Bank.
The October 7 attack led to a further intensification of terrorism, making 2024 an especially violent and bloody year in the West Bank. In 2025, the number of Palestinian terrorist attacks declined significantly by approximately 78%, while 1,374 major attacks were thwarted during the same year. The scale of these thwarted attacks was even greater than in 2024, underscoring both the level of motivation and the extent of Palestinian terrorist infrastructure in the West Bank.
When one also considers the substantial increase in weapons smuggling across the Jordanian border, which has contributed not only to Palestinian terrorism but also to Jewish terrorism and nationalist criminal activity, as well as the high level of friction between Israeli security forces and the Palestinian population, the picture becomes even more concerning. Given the nature and scope of the operations, including the evacuation and demolition of refugee camps, the situation resembles a field of “smoldering embers,” with an easterly wind threatening to fan them into a major blaze.
Security counterterrorism efforts are indeed suppressing Palestinian terrorism and preventing an immediate violent eruption. However, these accumulating destabilizing forces merely demonstrate the potential for a major conflagration at any moment. Any random incident, whether a deadly terrorist attack, an act of nationalist crime, or a provocation surrounding the Temple Mount, could trigger a large-scale confrontation.
Terrorism data for 2026 indicate a further decline in Palestinian terrorist activity across various categories. It is important, however, to consider the total number of attacks, including what is commonly defined as “popular terrorism.” Despite a slight reduction in the overall number of attacks in 2025, the scope remains extensive, reflecting both the continued Palestinian motivation to carry out attacks and the breadth of existing terrorist infrastructure.

The year 2024 marked a record high in the number of Palestinian fatalities during counterterrorism operations, while 2025 set a record in the scale of thwarted terrorist attacks.
These counterterrorism efforts led to the exposure and destruction of numerous organized terrorist infrastructures. In 2025, twenty-five terrorist infrastructures and workshops were destroyed, following twenty in 2024 and twenty-four in 2023. For example, during Operation Bayit VaGan (“Home and Garden”) in July 2023, an explosives laboratory and a large weapons cache were discovered within a mosque compound in the Jenin refugee camp and subsequently destroyed by IDF forces. This reflects the same operational pattern encountered in the Gaza Strip: the use of civilian infrastructure, perceived as protected from military attack, for terrorist purposes.
In June 2025, more than sixty Hamas operatives belonging to ten different cells were arrested in Hebron along with dozens of weapons. Some of these cells had been planning major terrorist attacks. Throughout the period, terrorist financing networks responsible for transferring millions of shekels from abroad into the West Bank were also exposed, primarily originating from Hamas headquarters in Turkey.

Alongside Palestinian terrorism, there has also been a troubling rise since 2022 in terrorism perpetrated by extremist Jewish elements, often defined as “nationalist crime” and attributed to a radical fringe, including groups such as “Price Tag,” “Hilltop Youth,” and similar actors. These are acts of violence committed by Israeli civilians, most often residents of outposts and farms, directed against Palestinians, their property, and at times against Israeli security forces as well.
With regard to attacks on Palestinian civilians, whether as acts of revenge for Palestinian terrorism, as a result of friction over grazing areas or territorial control, or as a means of demonstrating dominance and advancing political ideas such as Smotrich’s “Decisive Plan” or similar initiatives, many of these incidents constitute terrorism in the full sense of the term. The purpose of Jewish violence against Palestinians is often to instill fear in a civilian population in order to advance political objectives. These acts involve indiscriminate harm to people and property and, in many cases, bear no geographical or circumstantial connection to any prior terrorist attack against Jews in the area.
The data also indicate a troubling increase in the scale of Jewish terrorism and nationalist crime, as well as weaknesses in law enforcement efforts against them through 2025, a trend that intensified further during 2026.

The Palestinian Authority Is Approaching Collapse
The Palestinian Authority is a weakened and failing governing entity, suffering from a deep budgetary and functional crisis. In addition, it enjoys little trust among the Palestinian public. Hamas, despite a decline in its public support, remains the more popular political movement, with support levels nearly double those of Fatah.
The Palestinian security forces struggle to operate against Hamas infrastructure and terrorist networks in the refugee camps and generally avoid entering them, leaving the task largely to Israeli security forces.
Despite all this, security cooperation continues, and the Palestinian security apparatus makes an important contribution to counterterrorism efforts. Nevertheless, the overwhelming burden still falls on Israeli security forces. Since March 2022, there have been several cases in which members of the Palestinian security services joined Palestinian terrorist networks or were involved in terrorist attacks. The numbers are not large, amounting to several dozen individuals, along with a similar number of relatives of security personnel, but the phenomenon itself is troubling and alarming. It could expand if the Palestinian Authority continues to struggle to pay security personnel their full salaries, and especially if the level of friction remains high and family members of Palestinian security personnel are harmed as a result.

In the eyes of the Palestinian public, the Palestinian Authority’s lack of response to IDF incursions into the heart of West Bank cities and refugee camps, and to the aggressive military activity conducted there, as well as the weakness it displays in the face of escalating Jewish terrorism, settlement expansion, and the growing takeover of Area C, are all seen as evidence of the Authority’s functional helplessness.
This weakness further erodes the Palestinian Authority’s public legitimacy while strengthening the narrative promoted by Hamas and local terrorist groups, which present armed “resistance” as the only viable alternative. As a result, support for Hamas grows while support for Fatah continues to decline. The Palestinian Authority’s legitimacy crisis is further exacerbated by the public’s lack of confidence in its ability to generate a political horizon and advance the realization of Palestinian independence and statehood.
The combined crises of functionality and legitimacy undermine the stability of the Palestinian Authority and lay the groundwork for power struggles among those who see themselves as successors to the aging Mahmoud Abbas, along with their supporters, including armed factions loyal to them. In the absence of an internal consensus regarding the “day after” Abbas, and lacking a broadly legitimate leader preferred by the public, with the exception of Marwan Barghouti, who remains imprisoned in Israel, the likelihood of chaos, anarchy, and the disintegration of the Palestinian political system, potentially culminating in civil war, continues to grow.
The recent local elections point to the continued weakening of both the Palestinian Authority and Fatah, alongside the strengthening of local leaders, trends that indicate increasing fragmentation within the Palestinian political system in the West Bank. The convening of Fatah’s Eighth Conference likewise reflected the movement’s growing stagnation and its increasing alienation from the Palestinian public.
The fragility of the Palestinian system in the West Bank, combined with the weakening of the Palestinian Authority, invites intervention by external actors seeking to preserve the West Bank as an active front of terrorism against Israel and to strengthen Hamas as a rival to the Authority, or even as an alternative to it.
Iran and Hezbollah are investing enormous resources to maintain the West Bank as an active terrorist arena, including through the smuggling of military-grade explosives and weapons across Jordan’s porous border, as well as through the transfer of funds and operational knowledge. If the campaign against Iran and Hezbollah does not conclude with a decisive Israeli victory and a significant weakening of the regime, it could serve as a powerful easterly wind fanning the smoldering embers in the West Bank. Conversely, if the campaign ends with a severe weakening of the regime, its ability to continue supporting the terrorist infrastructure in the West Bank would be substantially diminished.
The Involvement of Arab Citizens of Israel
Since the outbreak of the escalation wave in March 2022, which began with a series of deadly attacks in Beersheba, Hadera, and Bnei Brak carried out by Arab citizens of Israel affiliated with ISIS, there has been a sustained and troubling increase in the involvement of Arab Israeli individuals in terrorist activity directly connected to the West Bank.
Israeli citizens who enjoy complete freedom of movement have served as logistical facilitators, smugglers of weapons and money, and perpetrators of terrorist attacks. This trend intensified over the years. In 2024, fourteen significant attacks within Israel were carried out by Arab citizens of Israel, and approximately twenty terrorist cells composed of Arab Israeli operatives were uncovered. These cells had planned attacks in cooperation with actors in the West Bank.
The radicalization trend continued in 2025, during which approximately 130 indictments were filed against Arab citizens of Israel for involvement in nationalist terrorism.
Turkey and Qatar Stir the Pot
Hamas headquarters in Turkey and Qatar exploit their relative immunity to function as centers of command, financial transfers, and psychological warfare through social media, while continuously challenging the legitimacy of the Palestinian Authority. The Hamas leadership in the Gaza Strip, as well as Hamas’s external leadership, particularly its West Bank leadership, has a clear interest in inflaming tensions in the West Bank by reinforcing the narrative of genocide in Gaza through occupation and starvation among the Arab public. In their view, images of the war fuel collective Palestinian anger, spark demonstrations, and increase the motivation of young people to embrace the ethos of violent resistance and join terrorist organizations as a response to what they perceive as Israeli aggression and oppression.
United Nations institutions and the international community, including international bodies and tribunals that promote the delegitimization of Israel, provide encouragement to Palestinian resistance. The Palestinian Authority’s expectation that the international community will impose a solution on Israel without requiring Palestinian concessions enables it to continue avoiding meaningful reforms regarding its governance and the cessation of incitement against Israel in the education system, the media, and the statements of political and religious leaders. This, in turn, reinforces a culture of struggle among Palestinians in the West Bank and contributes to escalating violence.
To break the deadlock in which the Palestinian Authority is too weak and corrupt to govern, while its collapse would create dangerous security and civilian chaos, a move with the potential to become a strategic “game changer” is required. One possibility is to incorporate the West Bank into the new international initiatives formulated as part of the “day after” arrangements for the Gaza Strip, foremost among them the expansion of the mandate of the Board of Peace. Consideration should be given to implementing this model, with the necessary adaptations, as a trusteeship regime in the West Bank for several years, either as a competing or alternative concept to the prevailing approaches. Such a framework could create the operational space needed to stabilize the system.
Expanding the mandate to the West Bank may be made possible by a historic window of opportunity created by the regional campaign against Iran and Hezbollah (“Rising Lion”). The dramatic weakening of the “Axis of Resistance” severely damages the ability of Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas headquarters abroad to continue fueling terrorism in the West Bank through weapons smuggling and financial support. At the same time, American leadership and influence in the region are strengthening, while the pragmatic Arab states, particularly the Gulf states that have directly experienced Iran’s destructive capabilities, increasingly understand the importance of stabilizing the regional system and neutralizing the Palestinian flashpoint.
It appears that the leaders of the pragmatic Arab states have internalized the reality that continued Hamas rule in the Gaza Strip is unacceptable and that dismantling the organization as both a military and governing entity is essential. At the same time, these states increasingly recognize that the Palestinian Authority under Mahmoud Abbas is genuinely incapable of implementing the necessary changes required to lay the foundations for a Palestinian state. In this context, conditions may be maturing for the idea of expanding the mandate of the Board of Peace, of which these states are already members.
Moreover, extending the mandate to the West Bank would strengthen and help ensure the success of the 20-Point Plan for the Gaza Strip. Experience demonstrates that the two arenas cannot be completely separated. Any effort to stabilize Gaza will inevitably be affected if the West Bank is in flames, and vice versa. Applying a unified trusteeship regime to both arenas would create a holistic framework that would make it significantly more difficult for Hamas to exploit the West Bank as a logistical and ideological rear base. It would also ensure non-political governmental, civilian, and economic continuity in both territories and eventually facilitate their unification into a single political entity (though not a geographical one) connected to the new regional architecture.
The organizing logic behind expanding the Board of Peace’s mandate and establishing a “trusteeship regime” is the creation of a political and security “time-out” lasting several years, insulated from domestic political pressures in both Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Such a pause would create the conditions necessary for stabilizing the system, correcting deep structural deficiencies, and developing new and creative opportunities for managing the Palestinian arena in a manner that integrates it into the emerging Middle Eastern architecture led by the United States, Saudi Arabia, and the Abraham Accords states. This framework would provide a practical and sustainable infrastructure, security, and economic horizon that would replace the two-state paradigm as envisioned in the Oslo Accords, a framework that no longer withstands the test of reality.
Taking the Initiative, Controlling the Solution
Despite the extraordinary operational achievements of the IDF and the Shin Bet, the reality in the West Bank remains fragile, troubling, dangerous, and highly volatile. Alongside a range of destabilizing factors that must be restrained and suppressed, several stabilizing factors can also be identified and should be strengthened. Suppressing destabilizing forces while reinforcing stabilizing ones could contribute to greater stability in Judea and Samaria.
The apparent stability, to the extent that it exists at all, rests almost entirely on military power and intensive counterterrorism efforts. The balance within the system currently tilts clearly and dangerously in favor of the destabilizing factors discussed throughout this paper.
We are witnessing a dangerous increase in both the scale and severity of Jewish terrorism and nationalist crime, including a 44 percent increase in serious incidents during 2025. This is true even though its scope remains far smaller than that of Palestinian terrorism and despite the clear absence of symmetry between Palestinian terrorism and Jewish terrorism. This violence serves as a direct catalyst for escalation, draws additional populations into the cycle of hostility, forces the IDF, already deployed extensively throughout the territory, to increase its presence even further, creates violent friction with both Jewish and Palestinian populations, and consumes valuable attention and resources.
In conclusion, the situation in the West Bank is approaching the limits of its capacity to absorb pressure. It resembles a pressure cooker without a release valve. The explosive combination of rising unemployment, collapsing governance, intertwined forms of terrorism, and external pressures transforms every isolated incident into a strategic threat. The disintegration of the system in the West Bank would lead to dangerous security anarchy that could rapidly spill over into the territory of the State of Israel itself.







