On January 9, 2024, Lebanon’s 128-member parliament finally elected a new president, Joseph Aoun, who was acceptable to all. This was no small feat. Lebanon had been without a president for the past two years following the end of Michel Aoun’s term on October 30, 2022. Deep divisions prevented the selection of a successor, leaving the country functioning with only a caretaker prime minister. The parliament convened 12 times to elect a president, but all attempts failed. According to the Lebanese constitution, at least two-thirds of the parliament members—86 out of 128—must be present to begin the election process, a quorum that lawmakers could not meet.
Under Lebanon’s constitution, the president must be a Maronite Christian, necessitating consensus among the Christian leadership. However, several politicians vied for the position in recent weeks since there is no single Christian leader capable of unilaterally imposing their authority—as Bachir Gemayel did upon his election in 1982. The two leading candidates were Suleiman Frangieh, Hezbollah’s favored candidate, and Samir Geagea, the legendary commander of the Lebanese Forces, the preferred choice of most Christian factions. Hezbollah leaders vetoed Geagea’s candidacy due to lingering animosities from the civil war of the 1980s.
Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s former secretary-general, insisted on Frangieh’s candidacy due to his strong ties with Syria and his perceived willingness to follow in the footsteps of former President Michel Aoun by reaching an agreement with Hezbollah in exchange for their support. In other words, Nasrallah counted on Frangieh to refrain from demanding Hezbollah disarm.
Meanwhile, the Christian camp supported Geagea, creating a deadlock in the election process. It isn’t easy to reach a broad consensus in Lebanon. Hezbollah delayed the elections by instructing its parliamentary members and allies (and, some say, through threats) not to attend sessions, thus preventing the required quorum. Consequently, Lebanon functioned for months and years without a president.
What changed after more than two years of stalemate? First, Hezbollah, weakened and defeated in its war against Israel, realized it needed to compromise. During ceasefire negotiations, Hezbollah’s new secretary-general, Naim Qassem, indicated that the organization would remove the obstacles it had imposed for months, facilitating the election of a president. While Hezbollah maintained its veto against Geagea, it agreed to withdraw Frangieh’s candidacy, paving the way for a neutral president who, though not favored by any faction, was also not rejected by any.
In the end, Lebanese Army Commander Joseph Aoun was elected president with 99 votes in the second round. Parliament also approved an amendment to the law shortening the minimum period required between a military commander’s retirement and their eligibility for the presidency.
This is not the first time Lebanon has chosen a military commander as president due to political disagreements, and it has almost become a tradition. In fact, in recent decades, four army commanders have become Lebanese presidents: Emile Lahoud (1998–2007), Michel Sleiman (2008–2014), Michel Aoun (2016–2022), and Joseph Aoun (2025–). Fouad Chehab was the first to take this route (1958–1964).
Christians, Muslims, and Everything in Between
It is impossible to write about Lebanon’s presidential elections without addressing the country’s system of governance, political landscape, interrelations between different sects, and multi-sectarian political structure, which ensures representation for the various groups within the population.
Lebanon gained independence from France in November 1943. That year, the National Pact (Al-Mithaq Al-Watani), an unwritten agreement, was forged between the country’s two dominant communities: Christians and Sunnis. This pact was based on a delicate system of checks and balances designed to ease Christian fears of marginalization or eradication in a predominantly Muslim region.
Christian concerns about Muslims were well-founded. Memories of the atrocities committed against Armenians by the Ottoman Empire just three decades earlier (1915) still lingered. Therefore, Christians insisted that the president be a Maronite Christian to safeguard their interests. On the other hand, Muslims ensured that the agreement maintained Lebanon’s “Arab face” and guaranteed its independence from Western, mainly French, intervention. Thus, the two communities shaped Lebanon’s fate for decades.
The National Pact sought to distribute political power among the sects according to their estimated demographic weight in the population, fostering peaceful coexistence. It established a system of sectarian governance that extended beyond politics to encompass economic, social, and cultural life in Lebanon. As a result, divisions between sects persisted.
Under this system, the president must be a Maronite Christian, the prime minister a Sunni Muslim, and the speaker of parliament a Shia Muslim. For context, a Muslim candidate cannot run for the presidency, nor can a Catholic or Protestant Christian. This system represents the homogeneity of an elite group that, despite losing its demographic and social influence over time, continues to cling to power.
The 1943 National Pact aimed to reaffirm Maronite Christian supremacy while representing a compromise between Maronites and Sunnis. It allocated most key government positions to their representatives. Druze and Shia communities viewed the pact as a fundamental obstacle to establishing a truly national state based on equality among all sects. This discontent eventually led to the civil war of 1975, with Palestinian military involvement acting as a catalyst.
Although Lebanon has lost its Maronite Christian character over the years, the sectarian governance system remains in place. The country’s demographics have shifted significantly, with the once-majority community becoming a minority and vice versa due to wars, low birth rates, and Christian emigration.
From Syrian Influence to Iranian Control
Since 1975, Lebanon has been mired in continuous conflict and severe disputes, primarily driven by Palestinian involvement and their attempts to establish a state within a state. Israel intervened during Operation Peace for Galilee (1982), dismantling Palestinian ambitions in Lebanon by forcing Yasser Arafat and his militias to flee to Tunisia as the IDF approached Beirut. However, Lebanon became entangled in a web of militias, all funded by Arab states like Syria, Iraq, and Libya. The Lebanese Civil War persisted until 1990, which was ended by the Taif Accord, signed in western Saudi Arabia by representatives of Lebanon’s various sects, symbolizing the conclusion of the civil war and the beginning of a new chapter.
Despite this, Lebanon’s challenges were far from over. Syria, under Hafez al-Assad, who believed Lebanon was severed from “Greater Syria,” took advantage of the situation to dominate much of Lebanon through a divide-and-rule strategy. Syrian involvement officially ended only after the assassination of Prime Minister Rafic Hariri on February 14, 2005. Two months after his murder and amid mounting pressure from Lebanese protesters, Syria, led by Bashar al-Assad, withdrew all its troops from Lebanon after nearly 30 years of occupation.
Following the Syrian withdrawal, Lebanon fell under Iranian influence. Hezbollah, established in the early 1980s, grew increasingly powerful. While other militias in Lebanon disbanded and surrendered their weapons to the Lebanese army, Hezbollah retained its arms under the pretext of serving as a resistance force against Israel. The group argued that the Lebanese army was too weak to handle this task alone.
This acquiescence to Hezbollah’s presence proved costly for Lebanon, not only because of the two wars it provoked—in 2006 and 2023—but also because it paved the path for Iranian dominance. Iran’s embassy in Lebanon became a hub for Hezbollah MPs and other Iranian allies. Hezbollah transformed from a non-state actor into a quasi-state military force.
During this period, bilateral relations with Tehran deepened, and Lebanon increasingly resembled an Iranian province in cultural, ideological, and economic terms. Iranian goods flooded Lebanese markets, and streets in Hezbollah-controlled areas bore striking similarities to those in Iran, featuring images and statues of figures like Qassem Soleimani, Khomeini, and Ali Khamenei. This Iranian influence persists, though indications suggest its decline, driven by Hezbollah’s weakening after the “Sword of Iron” war and the fall of Assad’s regime in Syria, which had served as a conduit for Iranian fighters, goods, and weapons.
The Right Man at the Right Time
In a fractured country like Lebanon, only a single candidate—a military commander—could become president without formally running or campaigning. In most countries, politicians court voters, present their platforms and undertake lengthy, expensive election campaigns. Joseph Aoun, however, did none of these. Others campaigned on his behalf. One day, he shed his military uniform almost out of nowhere and entered Baabda Palace in East Beirut as Lebanon’s president.
This abrupt transformation underscores the deep despair among Lebanese citizens—across all sects and parties—about their country’s political and economic turmoil, Hezbollah’s dominance, and the fragile ceasefire with Israel.
Not much is known about the personal life of Lebanon’s 14th president, who was previously the 14th commander of the Lebanese Army. Born in 1964, he is married with two children, educated at a Christian school, and resides in East Beirut’s Christian enclave. Aoun (no relation to former President Michel Aoun) holds political science and military studies degrees. He joined the Lebanese Army in 1983 and was appointed army commander in March 2017.
While Aoun has received several commendations during his career and participated in key military courses, including combating ISIS militias in northern Lebanon in 2010, he is not a war hero. Instead, he is seen as the right man at the right time—a consensus figure in a collapsing state. He has no enemies, no controversial history, and, above all, he led the army, considered a unifying national institution in Lebanon. These factors made him the ideal candidate for the presidency.
A Chance to Overcome Crises
President Aoun faces significant challenges. In his inaugural speech, just hours after his election, he struck a unifying tone, addressing Lebanon’s most pressing issues: ongoing conflict, Israeli presence in Lebanese territory, reconstruction efforts, and the question of Hezbollah’s arms.
“My promise is to rebuild what was destroyed by Israeli aggression in the south, the Beqaa Valley, the Dahiyeh suburbs, and across Lebanon,” he stated. “I vow to establish the best possible relations with Arab nations—this is an opportunity to strengthen ties with Syria.”
However, the most memorable line from his speech was: “We will ensure that arms remain solely in the hands of the state.” This declaration stunned Hezbollah’s MPs, who appeared visibly shaken. In the coming weeks, whether Aoun intends to disarm Hezbollah will become more apparent. For now, his immediate priorities include maintaining the ceasefire with Israel and deploying the Lebanese Army throughout southern Lebanon.
Having appointed Nawaf Salam, a former judge at The Hague, as Lebanon’s prime minister, Aoun will focus on various issues in the coming weeks. His agenda includes initiating military and economic recovery projects (e.g., promoting tourism), restoring Arab trust in Lebanon, distancing the country from Iran and its allies, and fostering closer ties with Arab nations, particularly the Gulf states, to secure financial aid.
Aoun’s election ends a political vacuum that lasted more than two years, offering hope for Lebanese citizens to overcome the country’s persistent security and economic crises. With backing from the U.S., France, Saudi Arabia, and other nations, Aoun has a rare opportunity to align Lebanon with the Arab and Western blocs. At the same time, he could take a bold step to disarm Hezbollah—a move most Lebanese citizens eagerly await.