Nearly 14 years have passed since the winds of the Arab Spring swept through Syria. At that time, crowds filled the city squares across the Middle East, hoping to topple dictatorships that did not represent them. While life returned to normal in most countries, the struggle for control in Syria between the regime of Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad and rebels in the north only intensified. This set the stage for the November 27 offensive, where Turkish-backed Syrian rebels surprised Assad’s regime, supported by Iran and Russia, ultimately toppling it. As of this writing, the rebels have ended the Alawite regime’s dominance, capturing Homs and entering Damascus. Assad has disappeared.
When the Syrian civil war began in 2011, many in the West believed that Assad’s refusal to meet protesters’ demands—such as holding free elections, ending corruption, and ensuring freedom of expression—was the main reason for the conflict. However, the core issue lies in Syria’s demographic balance. These demands, as legitimate as they may be, are far from neutral; they challenge the Alawite minority’s dominance over the Sunni majority. Since the 1963 coup orchestrated by the Ba’ath Party, Syria’s Alawites—who now make up only about 15% of the population—have controlled the Sunni majority, which constitutes roughly 74% of Syria’s population (including non-Arab Sunnis like Kurds, Turkmen, and Circassians). While the Western world perceives this struggle in terms of civil rights and democracy, the Syrian regime—led by the Assad family and the Alawite sect—is fighting for its survival.
As always in the Middle East, these internal struggles rarely occur in isolation. Iran and Turkey have been maneuvering behind the scenes. Shia-majority Iran seeks to preserve Alawite rule—viewing the Alawites as a branch of Shiism (Athnasharia)—and supports Assad militarily and politically. Iranian backing includes Hezbollah, a terrorist organization aligned with the Syrian regime. Since 2013, Hezbollah has actively fought against the rebels in Syria, achieving significant success in bolstering Assad’s power. The Shia axis was further strengthened in 2015 when Assad formally invited Russia for military assistance. Predictably, Russia’s involvement altered the conflict’s dynamics. With Russian air force support, Assad regained control of Aleppo in 2016. Naturally, this Russian military aid came at a price: in 2017, Russia secured military bases in Khmeimim and Tartus in exchange for its support. These victories enabled Assad to solidify his position in the country, driving the rebels north toward Idlib and other regions along the Turkey-Syria border.
The Return of the Ottoman Empire?
Although secular, Turkey is the successor of the Sunni Ottoman Empire. Under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkey was influenced by neo-Ottoman ideology, which aspired to revive Turkish influence in regions once controlled by the empire. While unofficial, Turkey openly empathizes with Syria’s Sunni population.
As a staunch neo-Ottoman, Erdogan is deeply connected to the past and seeks Sunni dominance over Shiism in the Middle East. In the Battle of Chaldiran (1514), the Sunni Ottoman Empire repelled an invasion by the Shia Safavid Empire of Iran, shaping the Middle East’s current identity. Riding that momentum, two years after Chaldiran, the Ottomans captured the entire Syrian region in 1516, holding it until the end of World War I.
This distant past continues to influence Turkey’s policies and is the primary reason for its involvement in Syria. At the outset of the Syrian civil war, Erdogan urged Assad to heed the Syrian people’s demands—mainly the Sunni majority—and hold free elections. When the Syrian dictator refused, Erdogan decided to support the rebels. From the war’s beginning, Erdogan made Turkey’s Hatay province the headquarters for the Syrian rebels’ “Free Syrian Army.” Notably, alongside these more “moderate” militias, jihadist groups such as Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the Organization for the Liberation of the Levant, gained control over Idlib in northern Syria. HTS, an umbrella group for various Sunni rebel factions—including elements of al-Qaeda and ISIS—was formed in 2017 and unites most Syrian rebels. Without Turkish support, these rebels would have stood no chance against the Syrian regime, backed by Hezbollah and Iran. Thus, Turkey has sustained the Syrian insurgency thus far.
Turkey has not hesitated to treat wounded rebels in hospitals in southeastern Turkey and has absorbed at least 3 million Syrian refugees.
Turkey’s involvement escalated in 2016 when it launched a military operation in Syria, officially becoming a combatant in the conflict. Although this operation was declared as targeting ISIS, Turkey’s fundamental objective was the Kurdish PYD organization, which Ankara views as part of the PKK, a Kurdish militant group recognized as a terrorist organization in Turkey and the West. Through further military campaigns in 2018 and 2019, Turkey solidified its control over northern Syria along its border. Turkey’s actions extend beyond military measures: it has built roads, established hospitals, a postal bank, and schools, effectively creating an “unrecognized republic” in northern Syria entirely detached from Damascus. This new entity depends entirely on Turkish governance.
The Critical Years 2022-2024
Turkey is deeply entrenched in Syria and has no intention of backing down—quite the opposite. It continues to fund its Syrian proxies and serves as the official spokesperson for Syrian rebels and the opposition in general. In 2017, Turkey became a full member of the Astana Platform alongside Russia and Iran to find a political solution to Syria’s civil war. Diplomatic efforts occasionally achieved temporary ceasefires and fostered dialogue, paving the way for initiatives such as establishing a “New Constitutional Committee” as part of a potential resolution.
These negotiations facilitated limited progress between Turkey and the Syrian regime. In December 2022, defense ministers from Russia, Turkey, and the Assad regime convened in Moscow to discuss a political solution. However, throughout this period, the regime—representing the Shia axis—maintained the upper hand. Consequently, Turkey initiated two normalization attempts with the regime: the first in 2022, before the Moscow summit, and the second in July 2023. As has become evident, neither effort led to a breakthrough.
While holding onto its territorial gains, Erdogan persuaded Assad to normalize relations. However, the Syrian dictator could not afford to allow Erdogan to “have his cake and eat it too.” Assad understood that accepting Erdogan’s overture would effectively grant international legitimacy to Turkey’s occupation of northern Syria. Therefore, he chose to reject the proposed normalization. In hindsight, Assad’s decision may prove disastrous—perhaps one of his final mistakes—since Erdogan’s offer allowed him to preserve some control: less than what he once had, but more than what he stands to lose now.
On November 27, the rebels shocked the world with a significant offensive against the regime. Perhaps Assad failed to grasp that the balance of power in the Middle East had shifted. Russia can no longer engage in the region as it did before it invaded Ukraine. Moreover, the “Iron Swords” operation delivered a severe blow to the Shia axis. As is well known, Hezbollah’s leadership—including the arch-terrorist Hassan Nasrallah—was eliminated. Alongside Hezbollah’s weakened position, Israeli airstrikes against Iran diminished its power and deterrence capabilities.
Erdogan seized the predator’s opportunity when he sensed the Shia axis’s vulnerability, exploiting Iran’s weakness. Turkey is now leveraging Israeli successes and the war in Ukraine without directly involving itself. Publicly, Ankara claims it is not taking sides in the rebels’ current campaign in Syria. Behind the scenes, however, Turkey continues to use the rebels to maximize its immediate interests. For example, shortly after the rebels captured Aleppo, they launched an attack on the Kurdish enclave of Tel Rifat, partially neutralizing the “Kurdish threat” in northern Syria.
Currently, the rebels control the streets of Damascus, and Assad has disappeared, reportedly fleeing by plane. These developments further solidify Turkey’s influence over Syria, bringing it closer to Israel. Following the regime’s downfall, the rebels will likely establish a Sunni-led government aligned with Turkey’s imperial vision. This situation could position Israel against Turkey, much like its confrontation with Iran in Lebanon. It introduces a new and dangerous dynamic that may exacerbate the deterioration of Israeli-Turkish relations, potentially placing them on opposing sides.
In the short term, Israel may lament the loss of the Alawite-Syrian regime, which provided stability for over 50 years. However, Israel must now formulate a strategy to address the new Syria and its emerging patron—Turkey.