Following the 2013 military coup that led to the ousting of Muslim Brotherhood member Mohamed Morsi, his successor, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, was declared by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan as a persona non grata. Thus, relations between Turkey and Egypt entered a decade-long dormancy.
However, it is interesting to note that economic relations between the two countries were hardly affected despite the diplomatic freeze. While trade volume declined, Egypt remained the top destination for African Turkish exporters, with bilateral trade volume remaining at $7.9 billion.
Despite all the ridicule he faced, particularly on social media in Turkey, Erdoğan once again demonstrated his flexibility. He implemented the famous motto of Turkish politics: “Yesterday was yesterday, today is today,” and made a sharp U-turn in his stance toward Sisi’s Egypt.
With no commitment to coherence, Erdoğan referred to his former bitter enemy as his “brother” and announced the joint intention of Turkey and Egypt to double their trade volume within the next five years. To facilitate this, the two presidents ensured the signing of 17 bilateral agreements across various sectors, including energy, trade, tourism, and even migration.
The migration agreement between the two countries hints at the possibility that Ankara may cooperate with Cairo in extraditing exiled Muslim Brotherhood members who fled Sisi’s regime to Turkey. This issue appears to be the ultimate test of relations between the two leaders. Security and intelligence cooperation were not officially included in the 17 agreements. This suggests that only after “building mutual trust”—namely, Turkey’s cooperation against Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood exiles—will Egypt feel comfortable deepening relations as desired.
Until then, despite the smiles and determined messages emphasizing cooperation between the two nations, Egyptian skepticism, rooted in the concerns accumulated over the past decade, will continue to shadow the strengthening of ties. After all, this episode cannot be disconnected from the broader and highly complex history of relations between the two countries.
Egypt Abandoned the USSR and Found Itself Alongside Turkey
The history of Turkey-Egypt relations has never been characterized by great affection. Until the Cold War, Turkey showed little interest in Middle Eastern affairs and made no significant moves to improve its standing in the region. On the contrary, Ankara viewed the Middle East as a “swamp” it should avoid in favor of cultivating its ties with Europe.
This situation gradually shifted with the onset of the Cold War, when the two countries found themselves on opposite sides of the geopolitical divide. During that period, Turkey became a NATO outpost in the Middle East and the Caucasus, while Gamal Abdel Nasser’s Egypt was a satellite state of the Soviet Union. Relations between the two nations only began to improve after Egypt lost its role as the leader of the Arab world following its decisive defeat by Israel in the Six-Day War in 1967.
The rapprochement between Ankara and Cairo intensified further after Egypt signed its peace treaty with Israel at Camp David (1978). Of course, Turkey’s warming ties with Egypt were not driven by “Zionist enthusiasm” but by Egypt’s abandonment of the Soviet Union and its de facto alliance with the United States. During Hosni Mubarak’s presidency (1981–2011), both sides enjoyed relative stability in their relations, mainly reflected in the growing Turkish exports to Egypt.
Despite Turkey’s good relations with Mubarak, when the Arab Spring reached Egypt, Ankara reacted with joy and enthusiasm. Erdoğan welcomed the far-reaching consequences of the Arab Spring with a smile and a sense of hope. As someone ideologically aligned with the Muslim Brotherhood, the Turkish president saw the Brotherhood’s rise to power in Egypt as a golden opportunity to expand his influence over the Middle East.
With a shared ideological alignment, then-Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi, a Muslim Brotherhood member, and Erdoğan became strategic allies in the region. Their friendship deepened further when Erdoğan hosted Morsi in Ankara in September 2012 at the grand party congress marking the tenth anniversary of Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP).
The Ouster of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Decline in Relations
As mentioned, relations between the two countries deteriorated dramatically in 2013 after the Egyptian military deposed Morsi under Sisi’s leadership. Unsurprisingly, Erdoğan condemned the move, calling it nothing less than a military coup. As expected, Erdoğan could not ignore the event and took a highly critical and confrontational stance against Sisi. In hindsight, domestic political considerations primarily influenced Erdoğan’s position, mainly his deep fear of a potential military coup against his rule.
Thus, following Morsi’s removal and imprisonment, the Turkish president launched a delegitimization campaign against Sisi, recalling the Turkish ambassador from Cairo and calling on Western countries to follow suit. These moves positioned him as the “knight of democracy,” and as part of this image, he also ensured political asylum for Muslim Brotherhood members fleeing from Egypt. If that were not enough, he even allowed them to establish television channels to undermine Sisi’s rule in Egypt through satellite broadcasts, circumventing his authority.
The Energy Crisis – An Opportunity for Israel and Egypt
Erdoğan deepened the diplomatic rift, leaving Egypt with no choice but to strengthen its ties with Israel, Greece, and Cyprus to find energy solutions. The four countries reached far-reaching agreements, including maritime boundary agreements (Exclusive Economic Zone—EEZ) and commitments to cooperation in energy transmission and long-term strategic planning.
Meanwhile, Turkey remained excluded from these plans, partly due to its unresolved conflict with Cyprus and its adversarial policies toward Israel and Egypt. Consequently, Egypt became one of the most vocal critics of Turkish foreign policy in the Eastern Mediterranean. For example, in 2019 and 2020, when Turkey violated the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus in the Eastern Mediterranean by sending its drilling ships Fatih and Yavuz into Cypriot economic waters south of the island, Egypt strongly condemned Turkey’s actions and stood alongside the Hellenic nations.
By 2020, Turkey’s regional isolation deepened even further when Israel and the moderate Arab states signed the Abraham Accords. The agreement’s success, symbolically showcased at the Negev Summit—where the foreign ministers of Israel, Egypt, the UAE, and Bahrain gathered—sent Ankara a clear message: Either Turkey remains isolated and excluded from regional economic and political initiatives, or it recalibrates its approach toward the Eastern Mediterranean countries (except for Cyprus).
Even an Earthquake Can Be an Opportunity
Since 2021, Turkey has begun recalibrating its foreign policy. Gradually, Ankara started restoring its relations with the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Israel, and simultaneously, it sought to open a new chapter with Egypt.
As part of this new policy, deputy foreign ministers from Turkey and Egypt began holding meetings in Cairo and Ankara. These discussions paved the way for a summit between the two presidents on the sidelines of the FIFA World Cup in Qatar. For the first time since Sisi’s rise to power, the two leaders appeared side by side in front of the cameras—smiling, even.
Relations warmed further after the devastating earthquake that struck Turkey on February 6, 2023. Like the foreign ministers of Greece, Armenia, and Israel—countries with historically complicated relations with Turkey—Egypt’s then-Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry visited Turkey, using the opportunity to strengthen bilateral ties. The positive atmosphere led to the mutual return of ambassadors, with both countries reinstating their diplomatic representatives on July 4, 2023.
This crucial step bore fruit within just six months. The improved dialogue paved the way for Erdoğan’s visit to Egypt on February 14, 2024. During the Cairo summit, the two presidents announced the formation of “The High Council for Cooperation between Turkey and Egypt.” Additionally, unofficial reports suggested that the two leaders discussed the possibility of Egypt purchasing Turkish drones for its military, though no official confirmation has been made yet.
Turkey’s Justification for Pushing Israel Out of the Philadelphi Corridor
At a joint press conference, Erdoğan explicitly stated that he and Sisi discussed various issues, including Gaza, Syria, the Eastern Mediterranean, Libya, Sudan, and the Horn of Africa.
In recent months, Turkey has been engaging in assertive diplomacy to mediate between Ethiopia and Somalia. As part of this effort, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan has already held two summits with his Ethiopian and Somali counterparts in Ankara. Given the longstanding tensions over the Nile River’s water flow, Ankara will likely offer to play a similar mediating role between Egypt and Ethiopia. If Turkey successfully positions itself as a mediator, this would significantly boost its influence in Africa and could also impact the situation in Libya.
Of course, this rapprochement raises questions about Egypt’s position in the Eastern Mediterranean, especially among the Hellenic nations. Turkey is taking all these steps partly to distance Egypt from the Greece, Cyprus, and Israel axis.
Considering Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s recent statements regarding the Philadelphi Corridor, in which he explicitly blamed Egypt for facilitating the smuggling of weapons and missiles into Gaza for Hamas, Turkey sees an opportunity. In general, “Operation Iron Swords” plays into Turkey’s hands by isolating Israel from Egypt and the region at large. To complete this maneuver, Ankara responded to Netanyahu’s speech with an official condemnation, rejecting his claims that Egypt is responsible for arming terror groups in Gaza.
Furthermore, Turkey has expressed full support for Egypt’s stance on the Philadelphi Corridor, which calls for Israel’s withdrawal from the border. Alongside its clear pro-Hamas stance, Ankara argues that Israel’s withdrawal from the corridor is essential to ending Gaza’s reliance on Israel for humanitarian aid.
According to Erdoğan’s latest statements during his summit with Sisi in Ankara, since the war began, Turkey has provided one-third of all humanitarian aid sent to Gaza via Egypt. In other words, Turkey sees Egypt as a direct channel to Gaza, bypassing Israel and its Ashdod port.
Thus, while Egypt still does not fully trust Turkey—mainly due to their complex history—the current situation allows Turkey to leverage Egypt in reshaping the regional balance of power, which is not in Israel’s favor. Given these developments, Israel must remain vigilant about Turkey’s growing influence in the region and, among other steps, strengthen its ties with Cyprus and Greece to counterbalance Turkey’s moves toward Egypt.
