At first glance, this appears to be a simple historical question. In fact, it touches on the heart of the sociological and political debate over nationalism. Nations generally do not emerge at a single moment, nor do they have to be groups that have existed for thousands of years in the same form. National identities are created and shaped over time through a combination of language, culture, memory, attachment to place, political institutions, historical experiences, and above all, a sense of collective belonging.
From this perspective, the question of whether the Palestinians were “invented” is misleading. It presents an artificial dichotomy between two possibilities: an ancient people that has always existed, or an artificial identity created out of nothing? The historical reality is more complex. Modern Palestinian identity took shape gradually, based on a local population with longstanding social, cultural, and geographic ties, and within political circumstances that changed dramatically during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
The central argument of this article is that the Palestinians can be understood as a real, modern national community, even if Palestinian nationalism has not always existed in the form we recognize today. At the same time, recognizing a Palestinian national identity does not settle the political questions concerning borders, statehood, Jerusalem, refugees, or an Israeli-Palestinian settlement.
A Nation Is Not a Birth Certificate
There are different approaches in the study of nationalism to explaining the emergence of peoples and nations. Modernist approaches emphasize that nationalism in its modern sense developed primarily during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, alongside the development of the modern state, mass education, the press, communications, territorial boundaries, and political movements. By contrast, approaches that emphasize ethnic and historical components point to the importance of long-term elements such as language, traditions, memory, family ties, religion, and attachment to place. The Palestinian case does not require an absolute choice between the two approaches. It can be seen as a combination of both.
During the Ottoman period, there was not necessarily a Palestinian national consciousness in the modern sense. People could identify themselves through their city or village, their family, their religion, their Arab identity, and the Ottoman Empire. At the same time, the region was home to a local population with its own language, culture, traditions, family ties, and deep attachment to the land.
In other words, the fact that there was not necessarily a “modern Palestinian nationalism” before the twentieth century does not mean that the social and cultural elements on which such a nationalism could develop did not exist. With the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the establishment of the British Mandate, and the transformation of the region’s political structure, the circumstances in which the inhabitants of the land defined themselves also changed. Alongside the development of Arab nationalism and the rise of the Zionist movement, a modern Palestinian nationalism gradually emerged.
The research of Rashid Khalidi, for example, emphasizes that early forms of Palestinian identity predated 1948 and even the Mandate period, and that processes of Palestinian national consolidation can already be identified in the early twentieth century. It is therefore important to distinguish between two different claims: “Palestinian nationalism took shape in the modern period” and “the Palestinians were invented in the modern period.” The first can describe a historical process; the second assumes that an identity formed during a particular period is necessarily artificial. There is no inherent basis for such an assumption in the study of nationalism.
Zionism and the Emergence of Palestinian Nationalism
Zionism played a significant role in the development of Palestinian nationalism, but this does not mean that it was the only factor. When one national movement defines a particular territory as its homeland and seeks to establish sovereignty there, this inevitably affects the other groups living in the same space. The development of Zionism, Jewish immigration, the struggle over the future of the land, and British involvement created a new political reality in which the local Arab population was also required to define its collective interests.
It can therefore be argued that Zionism and the conflict with the Zionist movement were major factors in shaping modern Palestinian nationalism. But this does not mean that Palestinian identity was merely a “mirror image” of Zionism. Internal processes within local Arab society, the development of Arab nationalism, changes under Ottoman and British rule, and the emergence of local political frameworks also contributed to the process. A more balanced explanation, therefore, is that Palestinian nationalism emerged from an encounter between a local sociocultural foundation and modern political processes, including Zionism and the struggle over the future of the land.
1948 and the Transformation of Memory into National Identity
If there is one event whose impact on Palestinian national consciousness is difficult to overstate, it is the 1948 war. For Israeli society, 1948 is the year of independence and the establishment of the State of Israel. For Palestinians, the same period is associated with the Nakba, the catastrophe, the loss of homes, displacement, and the creation of the Palestinian refugee problem. There is no need to view these two national memories as being in absolute contradiction. They reflect two different historical experiences of the same period.
For many Palestinian families, 1948 is not merely an event that appears in a history book. It is part of a family memory: the names of villages and cities, stories of displacement, photographs, documents, and objects passed down from one generation to the next. In this way, personal memory becomes family memory, family memory becomes collective memory, and collective memory becomes a component of national identity. A good example is the key symbol (al-Miftah), which represents the transformation of Palestinian family memory into a collective national identity, and is the central symbol of the Nakba and the “right of return.” It should be remembered that the physical keys were taken by refugees in 1948 in the belief that they would return soon, and they passed the keys down from generation to generation alongside stories of displacement and their original villages. Over the years, as the return did not materialize, the private object became a broad political and cultural symbol appearing in art, graffiti, jewelry, and commemorative events around the world.
There are parallel examples from different countries around the world. Following the Armenian genocide (1915), pieces of family stone crosses, khachkars, and memories of the home at the foot of Mount Ararat were passed down through generations in the diaspora, becoming central national symbols uniting the people around the demand for historical recognition. Similarly, stories of humiliation and family arrests surrounding “passbooks” during apartheid in South Africa were passed down to younger generations and, after the fall of the regime, became a collective symbol in museums and on the national Human Rights Day, commemorating the freedom that was achieved. In Ireland, too, the trauma of the “Great Potato Famine” and the survival of families by eating grass and clover were preserved in the stories of emigrants. Over the years, the shamrock became the unofficial national symbol of Irish identity and international solidarity. This is why 1948 is so important to understanding contemporary Palestinian nationalism. The Nakba and displacement are not merely political issues. For many Palestinians, they are part of the way national belonging itself is defined.
One People, Many Realities
Recognizing a Palestinian national identity does not require claiming that Palestinian society is homogeneous. On the contrary, the closer one looks at Palestinian society, the more its complexity becomes apparent. A Palestinian in Gaza lives within a different reality from a Palestinian in Ramallah. A Palestinian citizen of Israel exists within a different legal and political framework from a refugee in Lebanon. A Palestinian in Jordan may hold Jordanian citizenship, while other groups of Palestinians in Jordan have a different legal status. Within the West Bank and Gaza Strip, too, different political frameworks have developed over the years. The division between the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank and Hamas rule in the Gaza Strip since 2007 has created separate political and social realities. But political fragmentation does not necessarily mean the dissolution of a national identity.
A person can simultaneously belong to a particular family, be a resident of a particular city or village, be Muslim or Christian, Arab and Palestinian. These identities do not necessarily have to compete with one another. National identity can exist as an additional layer within a broader system of identities. The sociological question, therefore, is not whether all Palestinians agree with one another. The question is whether there is a sufficiently broad sense of collective belonging to create a national consciousness. From this perspective, the existence of a meaningful Palestinian identity does not depend on political uniformity.
Palestinian Citizens of Israel
This complexity is particularly evident among Palestinian citizens of Israel. Citizenship and nationality are not identical concepts. Citizenship is a legal and political status, whereas nationality is a system of identification and collective belonging. Therefore, a person can be an Israeli citizen while simultaneously seeing themselves as part of the Palestinian people and the Arab world. There is no inherent logical contradiction in this.
Here too, however, there is no “single position” shared by all Arab citizens of Israel. There are differences among individuals and groups, between generations and periods, as well as differences related to religion, place, and personal experience. The important point from a research perspective is to avoid generalizations. It is not correct to assume that all Arab citizens of Israel hold the same view of their identity, just as it is not correct to assume that all Palestinians hold the same position regarding the political future of the land.
The Refugees in Jordan and Lebanon
The Palestinian diaspora is another central component of national identity. According to UNRWA, the term “Palestine refugee” is used in the organization’s administrative context with regard to people whose habitual place of residence was Palestine during the relevant period, who lost their homes and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 war, as well as descendants eligible for registration under the organization’s rules. In Jordan, the reality is complex. A large proportion of registered Palestinian refugees hold Jordanian citizenship and participate in the country’s social and economic life, but there are also groups with different legal statuses, including some Palestinians originally from Gaza. In other words, Palestinian and Jordanian identities do not necessarily contradict one another.
In Lebanon, the reality is different. Over the years, Palestinian refugees have faced various restrictions relating to employment, property ownership, and access to services. These conditions have contributed to the status of being a refugee remaining a significant part of the lives of many Palestinian families. This creates an interesting phenomenon: geographic and legal fragmentation may actually reinforce the centrality of a shared national memory. When people live outside their homeland for generations, the memory of the place from which their family came may become a central part of how their identity is defined.
What Unites the Palestinians?
If Palestinian society is not homogeneous, what nevertheless makes it possible to speak of a shared nationalism? Several key elements can be identified: Arabic language and culture, a historical and geographic connection to the land, family and historical memory, the Nakba, displacement, Jerusalem, national symbols, place names, and national institutions and movements. What matters is not necessarily that all Palestinians agree on the meaning of these elements, but that they serve as a shared language of memory and belonging. In this sense, Palestinian cohesion is not based on uniformity. It is based on a common denominator. There are quite a few examples of this around the world, and here are just three. In India, Indian society includes hundreds of ethnic groups, languages, and religions, and deep tensions sometimes exist between them. Nevertheless, a shared history, national symbols, state institutions, and the memory of the struggle against British colonialism make it possible to speak of a shared Indian nationalism. In Switzerland, the Swiss do not share a single language: German, French, Italian, and Romansh are the country’s national languages. National identity rests largely on a shared political history, institutions, symbols, and attachment to the state, rather than on linguistic or cultural uniformity. The Kurds currently live in several countries, primarily Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria, and there are political, linguistic, and organizational differences among them. Nevertheless, a shared language and cultural heritage, historical memory, geographic ties to the Kurdish region, and national symbols provide a basis for the idea of a shared Kurdish national identity.
“From the River to the Sea”: Identity vs. Political Claims
The transition from the question of identity to the question of territory is where the discussion becomes political. The phrase “from the river to the sea” is a clear example of this. Throughout history, broad territorial conceptions of the area known as Palestine have been used, and at certain points the Palestinian national movement held a position that viewed the entire land as a single national territory. In fact, the slogan “from the river to the sea” defines the territory between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea, and reflects a historical and political struggle between identities and competing claims to sovereignty. The phrase gained momentum in the 1960s with the establishment of the PLO, and was then used as a call for the establishment of a single secular and democratic state throughout the territory of the historic Mandate. At the same time, similar geographic concepts existed within Zionism, such as the Revisionist movement led by Jabotinsky, and a similar formulation was even included in the Likud party platform in 1977, which called for exclusive Israeli sovereignty. During the First Intifada, the concept became a popular protest slogan, and was later adopted by Hamas in its 2017 charter as an expression of the total rejection of the State of Israel.
However, Palestinian political positions have changed over time. An important turning point came in 1993, when the PLO recognized the right of the State of Israel to exist in peace and security and accepted UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. At the same time, Israel recognized the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people. The Oslo Accords subsequently created a framework for negotiations intended to address the question of a permanent settlement. This development demonstrates why it is impossible to take a position or slogan from one period and present it as though it had represented the entire Palestinian national movement unchanged throughout history. Even today, different political visions exist among Palestinians: a Palestinian state alongside Israel, a single state, a confederation, and other proposals. Therefore, the question “What do the Palestinians want?” is insufficient. We should ask: What kind of state? Within what borders? What will be the status of Jerusalem? How will the refugee issue be addressed? What security arrangements will be in place? And what will the relationship between the two populations look like?
Are the Palestinians a People?
If the Palestinians are examined according to commonly accepted characteristics of a national community, the picture is relatively clear. There is a collective identity, a sense of national belonging, a shared language and culture alongside internal diversity, historical memory, a territorial connection, national symbols, national institutions and movements, and a significant diaspora. By contrast, there is no political uniformity, no religious uniformity, and no geographic uniformity, nor is there an independent sovereign Palestinian state representing all Palestinians. But the absence of a state does not necessarily negate the existence of a people. This is perhaps the most important distinction in the discussion. “People” and “state” are not synonymous. Throughout history, nations have existed without sovereign states, just as there have been states containing several national groups. Therefore, the fact that there is no sovereign Palestinian state is not an answer to the question of whether Palestinian nationalism exists.
Conclusion: Two Questions That Must Not Be Confused
The discussion of whether the Palestinians were “invented” sometimes misses the real complexity of the development of nationalism. A more convincing historical-sociological explanation lies between the two extremes. On the one hand, there is no basis for assuming that modern Palestinian nationalism has existed unchanged since the beginning of time. Palestinian national identity took shape through a historical process, primarily during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, within a reality shaped by the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, British rule, Zionism, Arab nationalism, wars, displacement, and political changes in the region.
On the other hand, this does not mean that the Palestinians were “invented” out of nothing. Modern nationalism was built on the foundation of a local population with a language, culture, family ties, memory, and territorial connection, and emerged from social and political processes that grew increasingly stronger. It can therefore be said that the Palestinians constitute a real national community, with a significant collective consciousness, even if it is not homogeneous and even if the history of its formation is complex.
But this also leads to another necessary distinction. The first question is sociological: Does a Palestinian national identity exist? The second question is historical: How and when did this identity take shape? And the third question is political: What should the political solution be, and what should the borders of a Palestinian state be, if one is established?
The answer to the first question should not automatically determine the answer to the third. It is possible to recognize the existence of a Palestinian national identity while still disagreeing with certain political claims made in its name. Likewise, recognizing the existence of Israel and Jewish national identity does not require agreement with every policy pursued by an Israeli government. In Ireland, Irish nationalism bridged a deep religious divide between Catholics and Protestants, as well as cultural and linguistic differences. This shared identity is reflected even in the national flag, which combines the groups and symbolizes peace between them. In India, despite extreme fragmentation into hundreds of languages, religions, including Hindus, Muslims, and others, and a rigid caste system, Indian nationalism was built on the principle of “unity in diversity” and political partnership, with official recognition of 22 languages. In Algeria, the National Liberation Front succeeded in uniting the Arab majority and the indigenous Berber (Amazigh) minority under a single identity, despite differences in language and way of life, in their shared struggle for independence from French colonialism. And this is perhaps the most important conclusion: recognizing the existence of a people is not equivalent to agreeing with every political claim made in its name.
The ability to hold these two distinctions simultaneously, between identity and state and between national recognition and political agreement, allows for a more precise, less binary, and more historical discussion of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Palestinians do not need to be an “ancient people since the beginning of time” in order to be a people. But the existence of Palestinian nationalism does not, by itself, determine what the political future of the land should look like. Understanding the history of the formation of Palestinian identity does not resolve the conflict. It enables a better understanding of one of the central national groups involved in it and of the reasons why questions of place, memory, displacement, sovereignty, and identity continue to be so central.
