Illegal Arab Construction
According to data from the Regavim organization, illegal Arab construction in Area C has surged by 80% over the past decade, compared to only a 10% increase in Jewish construction in Judea and Samaria. Illegal Jewish construction accounts for only 5% of all illicit construction in Area C, while illegal Arab construction comprises 95%.
Over the last decade, the extent of illegal Arab construction has increased more than 2.5 times. As of April 2022, there are approximately 81,000 illegal Arab structures in Area C, compared to only around 4,400 illegal Jewish structures—a disparity of about 2,000% in favor of the Arabs.
Beyond the surge in private illegal construction, more than 1,000 public buildings have been erected, with about 100 more in the planning stages. Additionally, over 1,000 kilometers of new roads have been paved. Simultaneously, water and electricity projects are being developed for illegal Arab settlements. The most significant aspect of Arab land control in the West Bank lies in the agricultural sector, which enables the seizure of large areas. Over the past five years, hundreds of square kilometers have been taken over through agrarian expansion. This activity also harms the landscape, including construction in nature reserves, illegal quarries, pollution, waste dumping, and damage to archaeological sites, with demands to convert some of them into Muslim heritage sites.
These figures are particularly concerning when considering that the mass eviction of illegal Arab populations from Area C would be extremely difficult to implement. Such an operation would likely trigger diplomatic crises and public confrontations with Western countries, some of which finance the illegal Palestinian settlements. The most prominent example is Khan al-Ahmar, near Kfar Adumim, which symbolizes Arab control over Area C. Despite a Supreme Court ruling allowing for its evacuation, successive Israeli governments have refrained from enforcing the ruling for over five years.
According to the research division of the Prime Minister’s Office, “Palestinian activity is reshaping the territory in anticipation of a future settlement. Already today, Palestinian activity has significantly restricted movement along the main roads, transforming the ‘transport corridors’ from the Oslo era into controlled and threatened routes, potentially endangering security and the sense of safety.”
Palestinian activity has intensified the isolation of Jewish settlements that are not part of major settlement blocs, such as Elon Moreh. From a political perspective, Palestinian efforts are shaping the future borders of a settlement agreement by connecting different parts of the West Bank and linking them to Jerusalem while altering the situation in the Seam Zone.
The research division of the Prime Minister’s Office warns. Given the success of the Palestinian campaign, Israel “is struggling to implement the government’s directive to freeze the situation in a way that preserves political maneuverability for future agreements, and it is doubtful whether it will be able to meet this objective in the future.”
Harm to Jewish Settlement
“We are surrendering to the Palestinians—they are winning,” laments David Elhayani, head of the Jordan Valley Regional Council (formerly the Jordan Valley Council) and, until recently, chairman of the Yesha Council. According to Elhayani, the Civil Administration’s demolition rate does not come close to keeping up with the rapid Palestinian takeover of ever-expanding territories in the valley. “We are losing the valley to the Palestinians and the Europeans,” he warns.
Elhayani states that the main issue is the strategic use of Arab structures, particularly clusters of buildings, to seize land and deepen the sense of insecurity among Israelis. He claims that the state leaves him powerless in confronting Palestinian law violations. “When [former Palestinian Prime Minister] Salam Fayyad’s plan gained momentum and illegal Palestinian construction accelerated, the Civil Administration assured me there was nothing to worry about and that there would be no enforcement vacuum against the Palestinian population. That was laughable to me then, but today, when it’s clear to everyone that there is a deep vacuum, the Palestinians are the ones laughing. What angers me most is being told to ‘take comfort’ because the situation is not as bad as in the Negev. But at this rate, we’ll soon reach the same level of lawlessness as the Negev.”
According to Elhayani, the lack of enforcement also harms the health of residents. “There are serious air pollution issues caused by mass waste dumping, plastic burning, and fires in general,” he says. “These problems originate from surrounding Arab villages. The Civil Administration does nothing to stop it. I’ve offered to enforce the law at my own expense, but they refuse.”
Elhayani is not the first to accuse the Civil Administration of bias. A former senior officer in the Administration’s legal department, Captain (res.) Ronit Levin described in an article how the Administration allegedly systematically worked to deny Jews the right to settle on available land in Judea and Samaria as part of a “political struggle.”
Levin’s policies, along with those of her colleagues in the Administration’s legal department, have manifested on the ground, with settlers in the West Bank claiming they are being unfairly targeted. In 2017, for example, the Civil Administration delayed the relocation of the Amona evacuees to temporary housing, arguing that the land was not designated for residential purposes and that its use would amount to approving a new neighborhood—despite it being state-owned land meant for displaced residents.
In the past, Civil Administration officials have declared that they would refuse to participate in imposing sanctions on Palestinians following Hamas’s inclusion in the Palestinian unity government, arguing that “the Administration has no right to exist if it imposes sanctions on the population it is meant to serve.”
Amid the rampant illegal construction, former Knesset member Moti Yogev (Jewish Home) has remarked that the Civil Administration operates like a third-world country. He accuses it of “inexplicable incompetence” when it comes to enforcing the law against Palestinian “construction terrorism” in Area C. Like Elhayani, Yogev has suggested “dismantling the Civil Administration’s authority” if reforms are not enacted. Former Knesset member Aryeh Eldad has gone so far as to accuse the Administration of being a pro-Arab body.
Land Registration
In recent years, the Palestinian Authority (PA) has invested considerable effort in land registration, exploiting a legal vacuum created in 1968 when Israel voluntarily froze the cadastral (land registry) process in the West Bank. As part of this effort, the PA has been advancing a land settlement project known as the “Palestinian Tabu,” which it presents as a direct continuation of the land registration processes from the Ottoman, British, and Jordanian periods.
Simultaneously, the PA is deeply involved in submitting urban development plans (TABA) to the Israeli Civil Administration. Since 2014, the well-oiled Palestinian mechanism has handled approximately 118 TABA plans at various stages of preparation and submission. These plans aim to serve around 125 villages and cover approximately 75 square kilometers. PA declarations indicate these urban plans are intended to accommodate approximately 260,000 people.
PA representatives have reported participating in around 1,000 professional meetings to advance these plans in recent years. According to the Israeli Ministry of Intelligence, “this figure also serves as further evidence of the administrative burden this project places on the Civil Administration, which has managed to address only a small portion of the submitted plans so far.” This overload hampers the Civil Administration’s efficiency and provides the Palestinians with an excuse to pursue unilateral avenues, claiming that the Civil Administration fails to meet their needs.
From the Palestinian perspective, creating a land registration infrastructure is a national goal with practical implications for statehood. Beyond these considerations, the project reinforces the PA’s sovereignty, strengthens its control over its citizens, and provides the Palestinians with a powerful legal tool in their judicial battle. The Ministry of Intelligence warns that without an alternative registration framework, “there is a significant likelihood that at some stage, domestic or international legal bodies will adopt the Palestinian land registry.”
According to PA-released data, by the end of 2019, Palestinians had “achieved” ownership registration for approximately 45% of all land parcels across roughly 940 square kilometers in the West Bank, including within Area C. Around 80% of these land parcels were registered in 2019 alone, which indicates a high registration rate.
This project contradicts agreed-upon norms and legal conventions and is being carried out without authority. Under the Oslo Accords, Israel holds exclusive jurisdiction over land registration in Area C. Additionally, in some cases, private Palestinian land registration has reportedly involved coercion, including threats against landowners.
It is important to note that this is not merely the registration of private Arab land ownership. Instead, it involves a comprehensive parcelization process that includes state land, survey land, areas beyond the separation barrier, land currently under Jewish municipal jurisdiction, and even areas with existing Jewish construction, military firing zones, and IDF bases. Measurement and registration activities in these areas rely on aerial photography or surveying conducted on Saturdays to minimize friction with the Jewish population in the West Bank, the vast majority of whom observe Shabbat.
Registration and Legalization
So far, the Palestinian campaign has achieved considerable success. The Palestinian land registration project, which encompasses the entire West Bank and serves as an alternative to the Israeli land registry, covered—by the end of 2019—approximately 45% of all land parcels across 940 square kilometers. Palestinian legal efforts to prevent demolitions by delaying enforcement orders on approximately 4,000 buildings have succeeded in halting the demolition of around 98% of illegal private construction and 94% of public illicit construction.
Additionally, the process of legalizing 113 illegal settlements continues.
Under the directive of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the PA has received copies of the Ottoman-era land registry (“Kushan” archive), a historical remnant from the Ottoman Empire’s rule over the region before the British mandate. This archive is a legal weapon in challenging the Israeli government’s land ownership claims.
The Israeli planning system has been inundated with approximately 118 urban planning proposals covering 125 villages (75 square kilometers) with a population of roughly 260,000 people.
Agricultural Land Seizure
Land seizure through cultivation can enable trespassers to claim ownership or usage rights by arguing that they have been farming the land for years. Palestinian land takeover plans exploit this legal loophole through extensive agricultural projects.
Research by the Regavim movement indicates that since 2012, the PA and its affiliated organizations have launched large-scale agricultural land seizure campaigns. These initiatives involve cultivating state-registered land and survey land that has not yet been officially designated as state land, covering an estimated 200,000 dunams (20,000 hectares).
Hundreds of kilometers of local and agricultural roads have been paved to facilitate this takeover, allowing easy access to the occupied lands. Additionally, hundreds of mobile and trailer-mounted water tanks have been distributed, water reservoirs have been built, millions of trees have been planted, and water infrastructure has been developed to support new agricultural activities.
Financial support for these initiatives comes from the European Union, European and Muslim nations, UN aid agencies, and foreign NGOs.
Many of these agricultural activities—such as fence installation, wall construction, heavy excavation, and road development—require permits, which are not granted. Consequently, the work is carried out illegally under the guise of agricultural activities. On the other hand, certain agrarian activities do not require construction permits, making it more difficult for enforcement authorities to prevent land seizures on state lands.
Meanwhile, in the Jewish sector, permit requirements for agricultural work are strictly enforced through military orders issued by the regional commander. These orders are applied exclusively against the Israeli population.
For instance, in 2015, the PA initiated land seizure efforts in a strategically significant area in eastern Gush Etzion by building roads and launching agricultural projects. Heavy machinery began constructing a new road eastward from the Arab town of Tuqu’. Along the route, extensive land preparation activities occurred, including clearing rocky terrain, digging water cisterns, and planting thousands of trees.
Regavim activists said this site was strategically chosen because it contains a narrow corridor of Area C land connecting Gush Etzion to the Dead Sea region. In recent years, Israeli government ministers have declared their intention to pave a road linking Gush Etzion to the Dead Sea, and this corridor is the only feasible location for such a road. The corridor is only about one kilometer wide. The PA’s de facto takeover of this strip connects two blocs of Area B land and effectively blocks any future Israeli road construction.
This move aligns with the PA’s articulated strategy: while the Palestinian Authority systematically executes its plans, Israel remains, at best, indifferent—and at worst, tacitly facilitates Palestinian efforts.
